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EVALUATING THE LEGALITY OF AGE-
BASED CRITERIA IN HEALTH CARE: 
FROM NONDISCRIMINATION AND 
DISCRETION TO DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
GOVIND PERSAD* 
Abstract: Recent disputes over whether older people should pay more for 
health insurance, or receive lower priority for transplantable organs, highlight 
broader disagreements regarding the legality of using age-based criteria in 
health care. These debates will likely intensify given the changing age structure 
of the American population and the turmoil surrounding the financing of Ameri-
can health care. This Article provides a comprehensive examination of the legal-
ity and normative desirability of age-based criteria. I defend a distributive jus-
tice approach to age-based criteria and contrast it with two prevailing theoretical 
approaches to age-based criteria, nondiscrimination and discretion. I propose a 
detailed normative framework for the use of age-based criteria in health care, 
the lifetime justice approach, that considers the future life patients can gain from 
treatment and the past years of life they already have experienced.  
INTRODUCTION 
In 2017, proposals to weaken the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) limits 
on health insurance premiums for older purchasers faced opposition from 
the American Association for Retired Persons (AARP), which exhorted its 
members to help “ax the age tax.”1 A proposed 2011 change in kidney allo-
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Rowell, Rob Kar, Wendy Parmet, and Sharona Hoffman for their detailed comments. 
 1 Ax the Age Tax—AARP, AARP, http://videos.aarp.org/detail/video/5349644641001/ax-the-
age-tax-aarp [https://perma.cc/CU4C-W6FP]; see also Patrick Caldwell, Watch This Squirrel 
Explain the GOP’s New “Age Tax,” MOTHER JONES (Mar. 7, 2017), http://www.motherjones.
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cation guidelines that would have given organs from younger donors to 
younger recipients was defended on the basis that, under current policy, 
“there are years of life being left on the table.”2 These debates demonstrate 
the importance and currency of this Article’s topic: whether age-based crite-
ria for access to medical treatment should be legal. 
I define age-based criteria for access to medical treatment as the use of 
an individual’s chronological age as a factor for determining access to med-
ical care.3 The following examples, based on real-life scenarios or pro-
posals, illustrate the use of such criteria: 
1.  Anne, fifty-five, is charged higher premiums for health insurance than 
Bashirah, twenty-five, because Anne is actuarially predicted to need 
more treatment.4 
2.  Charlotte, sixty-five, is assigned lower priority for kidney transplanta-
tion than younger candidates because she already has enjoyed many 
years of life and likely has fewer future years of life.5 
3.  Deepa, forty-five, is refused infertility treatment because providers be-
lieve her prospect of conception is so low that treatment would be fu-
tile.6 
4.  Eric, seventy-five, is not encouraged to get a colonoscopy because the 
evidence base for colonoscopy in his age group is lacking.7 
                                                                                                                           
com/politics/2017/03/pissing-off-old-people-seems-like-a-fabulous-plan/ [https://perma.cc/BC2Z-
49RU] (discussing AARP’s opposition to changes to the ACA). 
 2 Luis Fábregas, Kidney Allocation Plan Could Discriminate Against Older People, TRIB. 
LIVE (Feb. 25, 2011), http://triblive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/lifestyles/health/s_724572.html?printer
friendly=true [https://perma.cc/N7FY-XSVH] (reporting on the United Network for Organ Shar-
ing (“UNOS”) proposal and statement by physician Trent Tipple, who is himself a transplant re-
cipient); see also Mission, Vision, and Values, UNOS, https://unos.org/about/mission-values/ 
[https://perma.cc/L3YM-JX7W] (providing an overview of UNOS and the organization’s mission 
of connecting organ donors with donees). 
 3 This Article focuses on age-based criteria that apply to adults because of the special chal-
lenges presented by minors’ psychological capacities and the scope of parental authority. Cf. 
Dep’t of Civil Rights v. Beznos Corp., 365 N.W.2d 82, 87–88 (Mich. 1984) (holding that although 
state antidiscrimination laws protect minors, the laws do not require “identical treatment of chil-
dren and adults in every situation,” and observing that the contrary conclusion would dramatically 
disrupt contract law, social norms, and the parent-child relationship). 
 4 Cf. Caldwell, supra note 1 (discussing the proposal to weaken limits on health insurance 
premiums for older purchasers). 
 5 See Lainie Friedman Ross et al., Equal Opportunity Supplemented by Fair Innings: Equity 
and Efficiency in Allocating Deceased Donor Kidneys, 12 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2115, 2115–
16 (2012) (describing the kidney allocation system proposed by UNOS). 
 6 See Robert L. Klitzman, How Old Is Too Old? Challenges Faced by Clinicians Concerning 
Age Cutoffs for Patients Undergoing in Vitro Fertilization, 106 FERTILITY & STERILITY 216, 217 
(2016) (reporting on the American Society for Reproductive Medicine’s (“ASRM”) recommenda-
tions against providing infertility treatment to women over a certain age). 
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5.  Francisco, eighty-five, receives poorer quality long-term care because 
caregivers find it repulsive to care for older people.8 
6. Gail, fifty, is refused infertility treatment by a provider who believes it 
is unnatural for older women to give birth.9 
The two prevailing theoretical approaches to age-based criteria are 
what I call nondiscrimination and discretion. The nondiscrimination ap-
proach identifies with the use of “heightened scrutiny” in equal protection 
doctrine.10 Under this approach, age-based criteria are viewed with great 
skepticism, analogous to race-based criteria: they are permissible—if at 
all—only when they advance the interests of disadvantaged groups.11 The 
nondiscrimination approach would prohibit the use of age-based criteria in 
many of the above cases, with the possible exception of Eric’s; even in Er-
ic’s case, this approach would likely grant him a right to individualized re-
view if he sought a colonoscopy. In contrast, the discretion approach, identi-
fied with the use of highly deferential versions of “rational basis” scrutiny 
in equal protection doctrine, views age-based criteria as broadly permissible 
and gives wide leeway to medical professionals’ judgments.12 This ap-
proach would likely permit the use of age-based criteria in all the above 
cases, with Gail’s case presenting the closest question. 
Rather than adopting either the nondiscrimination or the discretion ap-
proach, or engaging in an ad hoc balancing of these approaches, this Article 
defends a distributive justice approach to age-based criteria. Instead of view-
ing age as a personal characteristic akin to race or sex, the distributive jus-
tice approach regards age as relevant in two ways to the distribution of an 
extremely valuable and widely desirable good, namely years of life. First, 
age establishes how much life someone has already enjoyed. Second, age 
indicates (though imperfectly) how much more life a person is likely to gain 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVS. TASK FORCE, USPSTF A AND B RECOMMENDATIONS (2018), 
https://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/Page/Name/uspstf-a-and-b-recommendations/ [https://
perma.cc/8AQD-AXLJ] (recommending that colorectal cancer screening start at age 50 and end at 
age 75). 
 8 See Tova Band-Winterstein, Health Care Provision for Older Persons: The Interplay Be-
tween Ageism and Elder Neglect, 34 J. APPLIED GERONTOLOGY NP113, NP120–21 (2013). 
 9 See Melissa Reynolds, Note, How Old Is Too Old? The Need for Federal Regulation Impos-
ing a Maximum Age Limit on Women Seeking Infertility Treatments, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 277, 
295 (2010) (arguing that providing infertility treatment to post-menopausal women is “unethical”). 
 10 See infra notes 64–94 and accompanying text. 
 11 See J. Grimley Evans, Rationing Health Care by Age: The Case Against, 313 BMJ 822, 
823 (1997) (analogizing age-based criteria to race- and sex-based criteria); John Harris, Editorial, 
It’s Not NICE to Discriminate, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 373, 375 (2005) (arguing that the “principle of 
equality applies as much in the face of discrimination on the basis of chronological age . . . as it 
does to discrimination on the basis of gender, race, and other arbitrary features”). 
 12 See infra notes 64–94 and accompanying text. 
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from treatment. A distributive justice approach also differentiates justifica-
tions grounded in distributive considerations—such as the higher predicted 
costs of treating older patients—from justifications grounded in animus or 
false stereotypes about older patients.13 The former can be justifiable, but 
the latter never are, and a distributive justice approach would therefore re-
ject the rationales offered in Francisco’s and Gail’s cases. The distributive 
justice approach is therefore aligned with the emerging animus-focused ap-
proach to antidiscrimination law.14 The distributive justice approach does 
better than the discretion approach at addressing genuine unfairness faced 
by older people, and it does better than the nondiscrimination approach at 
avoiding reliance on intrusive, costly, and divisive individualized judgments 
or the adoption of simplistic distributive frameworks that waste precious 
resources and ignore the compelling moral claims of younger people.15 The 
distributive justice approach, however, requires abandoning simple rhetoric, 
like the claim that “charging older people more” for health insurance is ob-
viously wrong, in favor of more nuanced positions, such as the stance that 
age-rated premiums can be appropriate but must be designed to be fair to 
people in different age groups.16 
Justifications for using age-based criteria can be grouped into at least 
four different categories: (1) those grounded in the interests of older patients 
themselves, (2) those grounded in the interests of medical care providers, 
(3) those grounded in the interests of society as a whole, and (4) those 
grounded in factors other than interests. I call these justifications “patient-
based,” “provider-based,” “societal,” and “non-interest.” Patient-based jus-
tifications typically involve safety or harmful side effects.17 They can also 
involve patients’ financial interests, especially when treatments have higher 
costs or lower efficacy in older patients. Provider-based justifications can 
also reflect safety fears: a physician may refuse to be complicit in inflicting 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See infra notes 95–170 and accompanying text. 
 14 See generally Dale Carpenter, Windsor Products: Equal Protection from Animus, 2013 
SUP. CT. REV. 183 (discussing animus). 
 15 Cf. Peter H. Schuck, The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Discrimination Act of 
1975, 89 YALE L.J. 27, 90–93 (1979). 
 16 See Rebecca Savransky, Senate Dem: Graham-Cassidy Is an “Intellectual and Moral Gar-
bage Truck Fire,” HILL (Sept. 18, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/351200-senate-dem-
graham-cassidy-an-intellectual-and-moral-garbage-truck-fire [https://perma.cc/D7FN-GGV8] (re-
porting on Senator Chris Murphy’s tweet). 
 17 See, e.g., Warren v. State, 778 S.E.2d 749, 763 (Ga. 2015) (noting expert agreement on the 
heightened risks of antipsychotic medications in older patients); Coombes v. Florio, 877 N.E.2d 
567, 574 (Mass. 2007) (concluding that patients’ age can make harmful side effects more likely 
and severe). 
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harm even on a willing patient.18 They can also reflect concerns about futili-
ty or inefficacy.19 More controversially, they may involve providers protect-
ing their own financial interests by, for instance, refusing to perform risky 
procedures on older patients because a failed procedure would hurt their 
success rates and thereby lower their reimbursements.20 Societal justifica-
tions for age-based criteria typically reflect concerns about the fair distribu-
tion of medical resources, especially resources that are scarce (such as 
transplantable organs) or expensive (such as chemotherapy medications or 
intensive care beds). These justifications often appeal to the ethical princi-
ples that scarce and expensive resources should go to individuals who (1) 
have a greater prospect of benefit, or (2) are at risk of dying young if they 
are not helped.21 Last, non-interest justifications aim to prevent “free-
floating evils” that do not implicate interests at all.22 Table 1 categorizes the 
above examples using this schema. 
Table 1: Categorizing Justifications for Age-Based Criteria 
 Disputes about age-based criteria in medicine often have deeply per-
sonal stakes: many of us fear the prospect of ourselves, or our parents, be-
                                                                                                                           
 18 See, e.g., Teneille Ruth Brown, Medical Futility and Religious Free Exercise, 15 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 43, 56 (2016) (observing that “nurses and physicians . . . resist feeling complicit 
in ‘torturing’ a patient with ventilators, pokes, and tracheotomies”). An excellent discussion of 
complicity that distinguishes provider-based and patient-based concerns can be found in Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and Accommodation, 19 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFF. 205, 227–30 (2000). 
 19 See Brown, supra note 18, at 56 (observing that physicians “do not want to be ‘indentured 
servants’ or ‘grocers,’ required to provide whatever treatment their patients and surrogates want”); 
Thaddeus Mason Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally Refuse Life-
Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1, 16 (2007) (stating that “many health care providers do 
not consider the practice of medicine to include measures aimed solely at maintaining corporeal 
existence and biologic functioning”). 
 20 See Bjorg Thorsteinsdottir, Keith M. Swetz & Jon C. Tilburt, Dialysis in the Frail Elder-
ly—A Current Ethical Problem, an Impending Ethical Crisis, 28 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1511, 
1511 (2013) (discussing the refusal of services to older patients for financial reasons). The permis-
sibility of at least some self-serving choice by physicians is defended in Paul Litton, Physician 
Participation in Executions, the Morality of Capital Punishment, and the Practical Implications of 
Their Relationship, 41 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 333, 341 (2013) (arguing that “a physician’s personal 
interests, unrelated to promoting health, represent legitimate limits to the duty of patient loyalty”). 
 21 See Govind Persad, Priority Setting, Cost-Effectiveness, and the Affordable Care Act, 41 
AM. J.L. & MED. 119, 136–37 (2015). 
 22 See JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING 17–20 (1988) (introducing the concept of a 
“free-floating evil”). 
Patient-Based Provider-Based Societal Non-Interest 
Eric 
Deepa 
Anne (private insurer) 
Francisco 
Charlotte 
Anne (government 
insurer) 
Gail 
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ing assigned lower priority for medical treatment in old age. Although I do 
not expect to defuse controversy, a few clarifications can help avert poten-
tial misinterpretations. First, the distributive justice approach regards the 
use of age-based criteria that may disadvantage some older patients as a 
fallback option. Treating everyone, if it can be done without sacrificing any-
thing of moral importance, is ethically preferable to denying beneficial 
treatment to some. That some treatments are less effective in older patients, 
which supports a patient-based justification for the use of age-based criteria, 
should also motivate a search for treatments that are effective in all popula-
tion groups.23 Similarly, when evaluating societal justifications grounded in 
resource scarcity, the first option should always be to assess whether genu-
ine scarcity exists, rather than treating scarcity as fixed or unchangeable.24 
Scarcity exists on a spectrum, ranging from conflicts over access to organs 
(where increasing supply is difficult) to conflicts over access to medicines 
(where the only barrier is money). Older people’s claims to scarce treat-
ment, even if weaker than the claims of younger people, may be stronger 
than wealthy people’s claims to retain wealth that could be used to amelio-
rate scarcity.25 But even though scarcity frequently stems from background 
injustice and resource misallocation, the need to allocate scarce resources 
fairly persists. Last, because the distributive justice approach appeals to 
scarcity, it differs from the approach taken by Daniel Callahan and others, 
which regards the provision of life-extending treatment to older adults as 
undesirable even in the absence of scarcity.26 
 Second, the distributive justice approach is not committed to the view 
that age must be the decisive factor in every decision. Hypotheticals that 
compare deserving older people to undeserving younger ones, or greater 
numbers of older people to lesser numbers of younger ones, are therefore 
beside the point.27 Such hypotheticals do not show that age is irrelevant, but 
only that it can be outweighed by other considerations. This Article’s goal is 
                                                                                                                           
 23 Cf. Klitzman, supra note 6, at 217 (reporting on the ASRM’s recommendations against 
providing infertility treatment to women over a certain age). 
 24 Cf. Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Govind Persad, The Ethics of Expanding Access to Cheaper, 
Less-Effective Treatments—Authors’ Reply, 389 LANCET 1008, 1008 (2017) (arguing that the cost 
and availability of medical resources are variable and impacted by social and political decision 
making). 
 25 Cf. Frank Pasquale, Book Review, 32 J. LEGAL MED. 529, 535–36 (2011) (reviewing M. 
GREGG BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH (2011) and arguing that “[t]he current scarcity of care 
for the least well off is not a natural feature of the world; rather, it is epiphenomenal of repeated 
decisions not to impose certain tax burdens today”). 
 26 DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS 116 (1987); see also Nancy S. Jecker, Disenfranchis-
ing the Elderly from Life-Extending Medical Care, 2 PUB. AFF. Q. 51, 64–65 (1988) (explaining 
that Callahan’s view and a similar view defended by Alasdair MacIntyre do not rely on scarcity). 
 27 See, e.g., Michael M. Rivlin, Several Other Markers of Fairness Exist, Besides Age, 314 
BMJ 514, 514 (1997) (presenting hypotheticals). 
896 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:889 
not to offer a complete theory of justice in health, but to defend the proposi-
tion that age-based criteria can be part of a just health care system. 
Part I of this Article explains that age discrimination statutes, as well as 
the Equal Protection Clause and similar state constitutional provisions, permit 
the use of age-based criteria when those criteria have a rational grounding and 
do not appeal to animus or bias.28 These laws therefore leave room open for 
the use of a distributive justice approach. Part II argues that the conceptual 
underpinnings of antidiscrimination law do not support the enactment of new 
law, or the adoption of new interpretations of existing law, that would reject 
the use of age-based criteria.29 Part III proposes a detailed normative frame-
work for the use of age-based criteria in health care, the lifetime justice ap-
proach, that considers the future life patients can gain from treatment and the 
past years of life they already have experienced.30 The lifetime justice ap-
proach also includes a principle of nonabandonment, which supports the con-
tinued provision of supportive medical care to older people in need.31 Part III 
then defends this framework against objections—most prominently, the ob-
jection that it disregards the moral equality of older people.32 Part IV applies 
the analysis offered in the earlier Parts to age-based criteria employed in vari-
ous areas of medical practice and health policy, including the examples of 
transplantation and health insurance discussed at the outset.33 
I. THE LEGALITY OF AGE-BASED CRITERIA: DOCTRINE 
In this Part, I consider whether federal and state antidiscrimination 
statutes or equal protection provisions in the federal Constitution and many 
state constitutions support a limitation on the use of age-based criteria for 
access to medical treatment.34 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See infra notes 34–94 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 95–170 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 171–242 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 202–209 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 210–242 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 243–296 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 35–94 and accompanying text. Outside of the employment context, where 
age discrimination can sometimes support common-law wrongful discharge actions, there are few 
avenues for bringing common-law age discrimination claims. 
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A. Antidiscrimination Statutes 
1. Federal Statutes 
Section 1557 of the ACA includes language proscribing age discrimi-
nation.35 This language has been welcomed by commentators and advocates 
who believe that age-based criteria should be analyzed using an antidiscrim-
ination framework and should frequently be rejected as unacceptable.36 Ra-
ther than crafting an entirely new approach to age discrimination or borrow-
ing the approaches used for race, sex, or disability discrimination, § 1557’s 
prohibition on age discrimination adopts and extends the approach taken in 
the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (“Age Act”).37 The Age Act specifies 
that “no person in the United States shall, on the basis of age, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimi-
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Valarie K. Blake, An Opening for Civil Rights in Health Insurance After the Affordable 
Care Act, 36 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 235, 269 (2016) (describing a Connecticut court’s reliance, in 
part, on § 1557 to remove an age limit for infertility treatment); Andrew C. Stevens, Patient Dis-
crimination Litigation Under Section 1557 of the ACA: A Sleeping Giant?, 9 J. HEALTH & LIFE 
SCI. L. 111, 116 (2016) (“It is clear that this sleeping giant of patient discrimination litigation is 
beginning to wake. Will the health care industry be ready?”); Sidney D. Watson, Section 1557 of 
the Affordable Care Act: Civil Rights, Health Reform, Race, and Equity, 55 HOW. L.J. 855, 880 
(2012) (noting novelty and breadth of § 1557). The ACA contains additional provisions that ex-
plicitly direct when age may be used in medical decision making, which I discuss in other work. 
See Persad, supra note 21, at 136–38, 140–46 (2015). 
 36 See NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., STATE OF WOMEN’S COVERAGE: HEALTH PLAN VIOLA-
TIONS OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 19 (2015), https://www.nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/08/stateofcoverage2015final.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5NP-CRZQ] (criticizing insurers that 
limit coverage for reproductive health services based on age); Blake, supra note 35, at 270; see also 
Community Catalyst, Comment Letter on  Proposed Rule on Nondiscrimination in Health Programs 
and Activities (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2016-05-18/pdf/2016-
11458.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q9Z-MKFQ] (arguing that DHHS should prohibit “[p]lacing age limits 
on certain types of reproductive health services based on the age of the recipient”); Letter from M. 
James Kaufman, Vice President, Public Policy, Children’s Hosp. Ass’n, to Jocelyn Samuels, Dir., 
Office for Civil Rights., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.childrens
hospitals.org/-/media/Files/CHA/Main/Issues_and_Advocacy/Key_Issues/Medicaid/Letters_and_
Testimony/2015/CCH_Comments_1557_Nondiscrimination_Proposed_Rule11,-d-,09,-d-,2015.
pdf [https://perma.cc/PU4N-GWG3] (arguing that the DHHS should clarify that insurers cannot 
impose “arbitrary age” limits). 
 37 See The Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101–6107 (2012) (“Age Act”) 
(listing the regulations that prohibit age-based discrimination in any program or activity that re-
ceives federal funds). The Health Security Act (HSA) proposed during the 1990s also would have 
incorporated the Age Act’s provisions. See Vernellia R. Randall, Does Clinton’s Health Care 
Reform Proposal Ensure (E)qual(ity) of Health Care for Ethnic Americans and the Poor? 60 
BROOK. L. REV. 167, 193 n.127 (1994). 
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nation under, any program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance.”38 
There is no published precedent either prohibiting the use of an age-
based criterion in health care under § 1557 or upholding the use of such a 
criterion. Valarie Blake reports that Connecticut modified its age-based cri-
teria for reimbursing infertility treatments in light of § 1557, although it 
also relied on new medical evidence, leaving ambiguous whether age-based 
criteria were universally barred, or whether the new evidence in this par-
ticular situation made the difference.39 The Age Act itself also has not gen-
erated precedent in the health context, although the Obama administration’s 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) raised informal con-
cerns that proposals, such as the proposal discussed in the introduction, to 
“age-match” organs for transplantation—i.e. to provide organs from donors 
of a given age to recipients in roughly the same age bracket—would violate 
the Age Act.40 Transplantation scholars argued that a well-designed age-
matching proposal should be legal when impacts on individuals over their 
entire lifetimes are considered, and DHHS apparently conceded that age-
based criteria can be acceptable when age is not the sole factor considered 
in determining eligibility, or when age-based cutoffs are supported by a de-
tailed justification.41 
The modest academic literature on the Age Act’s applicability to medi-
cine has reached little consensus. Some commentators assert that the use of 
age cutoffs for access to medical procedures would violate the Age Act, 
others claim that the Age Act offers little protection in practice against the 
allocation of resources by age, and another concludes that the question is a 
                                                                                                                           
 38 42 U.S.C. § 6102. The applicability of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) to health insurance designs that differentiate beneficiaries based on age has also generat-
ed some litigation. See, e.g., Am. Ass’n of Ret. Pers. v. EEOC, 489 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 39 Blake, supra note 35, at 269. 
 40 Ross et al., supra note 5, at 2115–16 (noting the HHS’s concerns that the kidney allocation 
proposal’s age-matching formula is arbitrary); see also David L. Weimer, Stakeholder Govern-
ance of Organ Transplantation: A Desirable Model for Inducing Evidence-Based Medicine? 4 
REG. & GOVERNANCE 281, 291 (2010) (observing that, after the introduction of a proposal for 
organ allocation in 2009, “HHS staff who sit ex officio on the committees . . . expressed concern 
that, because the proposal uses age as a factor in predicting net benefits, the HHS Office of Civil 
Rights might object on the basis of age discrimination”). 
 41 Richard N. Formica, John J. Friedewald & Mark Aeder, Changing the Kidney Allocation 
System: A 20-Year History, 3 CURRENT TRANSPLANTATION REP. 39, 40 (2016) (reporting that the 
Office of Civil Rights advised that age could be used to determine kidney allocation if it is not the 
sole factor and that “if age was to be used as a single metric, there must be a rationale as to why 
15 versus 14 versus 16 years was chosen”); Ross et al., supra note 5, at 2118 (arguing for an allo-
cation system that equalizes treatment for individuals at different life stages). 
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close one.42 Some also suggest that the use of age as one factor among 
many is more legally defensible than the use of age as a sole factor.43 
I will argue that two major exceptions in the Age Act—those for (1) 
age-based criteria explicitly adopted in law and (2) the “normal operation” 
of programs—leave ample room for distributive justice considerations. 
First, the Age Act does not apply to criteria that are themselves explicitly 
adopted in federal, state, or local law or that are necessary for the achieve-
ment of objectives adopted in such law.44 This exemption is consonant with 
the distributive justice approach: it allows legislative bodies, which are the 
proper actors to make population-level distributive judgments, to consider 
age.45 That the Age Act permits age-based criteria that are explicitly ap-
proved under state law supports the view that Connecticut’s decision to 
change its infertility reimbursement guidelines was motivated by new em-
pirical evidence, rather than by a broad § 1557 prohibition on the use of 
                                                                                                                           
 42 See Howard Eglit, Health Care Allocation for the Elderly: Age Discrimination by Another 
Name? 26 HOUS. L. REV. 813, 873–74 (1989) (discussing the administrative challenges of imple-
menting the Age Act); Thomas D. Overcast & Roger W. Evans, Technology Assessment, Public 
Policy and Transplantation: A Restrained Appraisal of the Massachusetts Task Force Approach, 
13 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 106, 109 (1985) (explaining that the exceptions in the Age Act 
that permit using age as a factor weaken the likelihood that the Age Act will be used to challenge 
an age discrimination claim); Jessica Dunsay Silver, From Baby Doe to Grandpa Doe: The Impact 
of the Federal Age Discrimination Act on the “Hidden” Rationing of Medical Care, 37 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 993, 1070 (1988) (asserting that a health care provider who continually refuses to treat 
patients due to their age could be subject to the Age Act); see also Patrick R. Grady, You’ve Got to 
Have (a) Heart: Allocating Hearts for Transplantation: Should Age Make a Difference?, 7 EXPE-
RIENCE 12, 14 (1997) (noting that the applicability of the Age Act to Medicare and Medicaid is 
uncertain); Haavi Morreim, Should Age Be a Basis for Rationing Health Care?: Commentary 1, 
16 VIRTUAL MENTOR 339, 341 (2014) (arguing that an age cutoff for access to medical treatment 
would likely violate the Age Act); Karen DeBolt, Comment, What Will Happen to Granny? Age-
ism in America: Allocation of Healthcare to the Elderly & Reform Through Alternative Avenues, 
47 CAL. W. L. REV. 127, 166 (2010) (noting that the Age Act does little to protect older persons 
from Medicare’s “rationing of heart transplants”); Benjamin Eidelson, Comment, Kidney Alloca-
tion and the Limits of the Age Discrimination Act, 122 YALE L.J. 1635, 1645 (2013) (stating that 
the convergence of the Age Act’s purpose and its application presents “difficult questions”). 
 43 Silver, supra note 42, at 1070 (arguing that the use of age as one factor among others ena-
bles fairness, individualized examinations, and provides practical advantages); see also Eidelson, 
supra note 42, at 1650 (arguing that a “compound longevity estimate” including non-age factors 
may be more legally defensible). 
 44 42 U.S.C. § 6103 (listing the exemptions to the Age Act). As one case puts it, “[t]he Age 
Discrimination Act differs somewhat from the other civil rights statutes in that the Age Discrimi-
nation Act itself specifies certain categories of age discrimination which will be considered per-
missible.” NAACP v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 316 (D. Del. 1980), aff’d sub 
nom. NAACP v. Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981). 
 45 Cf. Peter M. Gerhart, The Tragedy of TRIPS, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 143, 159 (arguing 
that “[l]egislatures can reflect the kind of basic values and shared goals that allow distributive 
policies to be enacted and sustained”). 
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age-based criteria.46 Had Connecticut wanted to continue using age-based 
criteria for reimbursement, it could have done so by passing legislation. The 
distributive justice approach can also explain why age-based criteria adopt-
ed by administrators rather than legislators remain subject to the Age Act; 
although some have questioned “how an age distinction can be discrimina-
tory when adopted by program administrators and not discriminatory when 
enacted by legislators,” administrative discretion allows more room for bi-
ased judgments than an explicit legislative enactment does.47 
The “normal operation” exception also allows for distributive consid-
erations and rejects a pure nondiscrimination approach. The permissibility 
of taking age into account as a factor necessary for the normal operation of 
a program is judged by a four-part test: (1) age must be used as a measure 
of some other characteristic, (2) the other characteristic must itself be im-
portant to the normal operation or statutory objective of the activity, (3) age 
must be a reasonable proxy for the other characteristic, and (4) direct meas-
urement of the other characteristic must be impractical.48 This exception 
would allow the use of age as a proxy for future life expectancy. It also 
could allow the use of age as a comparative measure of past years of life 
lived, even while prohibiting the use of approaches that set an absolute age 
cutoff. Although knowing a person’s age also tells you how many years of 
life  a person has lived, the fact of age in itself is different from the number 
of years someone has already enjoyed (to which the distributive justice ap-
proach appeals).49 
Section 1557, following the Age Act’s framework, also requires com-
plainants to exhaust administrative remedies, including mediation, before 
filing suit.50 During the rulemaking process, some advocates argued that 
§ 1557 should be interpreted to drop the Age Act’s administrative exhaus-
tion requirement, resulting in age discrimination claims being treated iden-
tically to race or sex discrimination claims, where exhaustion is not re-
                                                                                                                           
 46 Cf. Blake, supra note 35, at 269 (stating that the court’s reasoning was ambiguous). 
 47 Silver, supra note 42, at 1035; see 45 C.F.R. § 90.13 (2018) (defining normal operation as 
the “operation of a program or activity without significant changes that would impair its ability to 
meet its objectives”). 
 48 45 C.F.R. § 90.14 (listing the four exceptions to the prohibition on using age as a factor). 
 49 Cf. Espen Gamlund, What Is So Important About Completing Lives? A Critique of the Mod-
ified Youngest First Principle of Scarce Resource Allocation, 37 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETH-
ICS 113, 123 n.18 (2017) (distinguishing “the moral relevance of age simpliciter” from the signifi-
cance of age as “an important indicator of the degree of completion of a life”). 
 50 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 91.42-44, 91.50 (explicitly requiring exhaustion of administrative reme-
dies); Phoebe Weaver Williams, Age Discrimination in the Delivery of Health Care Services to 
Our Elders, 11 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 1, 33–35 (2009) (describing the Age Act’s administra-
tive procedural requirements). 
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quired.51 The final rules, however, maintained the administrative exhaustion 
requirement.52 The choice to maintain the administrative exhaustion re-
quirement is consistent with the distributive justice approach in that media-
tion and administrative remedies may be appropriate for a distributive disa-
greement, whereas proceeding directly to litigation is more appropriate 
where an inherently objectionable criterion such as race or sex is at issue.53 
2. State and Local Statutes 
State civil rights statutes often proscribe age discrimination in public ac-
commodations.54 (Some, however, contain explicit exemptions for age-based 
criteria targeting minors, for reasonable consideration of age in general, or for 
laws that disadvantage people under forty.) 55 Some state statutes specific to 
the operation of health programs, such as clinical research or sterile injection 
                                                                                                                           
 51 See Healthcare and Equal. Experts, Comment on Proposed Rule on Nondiscrimination in 
Health Programs and Activities (Nov. 8, 2015), https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/
Solomon/healthcareequalitylawexpertsltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5GU-LBST] (describing the re-
quirement for administrative exhaustion of age discrimination claims as an “absurd conse-
quence[]” given that sex discrimination claims do not require administrative exhaustion); cf. 
Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-CV-2037, 2015 WL 1197415, at *11 (D. Minn. Mar. 
16, 2015) (rejecting the “illogical result” of having different procedural requirements apply 
whether the § 1557 plaintiff’s claim is due to “race, sex, age, or disability”); Watson, supra note 
35, at 880 (noting that § 1557 plaintiffs “appear to have their choice of process”). 
 52 See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,441 (May 18, 
2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92) (providing that “[m]ediation and exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies will still be required for age discrimination allegations in complaints, but not for 
allegations of other covered types of discrimination”). 
 53 Cf. Schuck, supra note 15, at 63 (contrasting the Age Act with Title VI, which prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of race or ethnicity). 
 54 See Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, State Public Accommodation Laws (2016), http://
www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-public-accommodation-laws.aspx [https://
perma.cc/RA5Q-57GJ] (listing nineteen states that prohibit “age-based discrimination in areas of 
public accommodation”). 
 55 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64 (2018) (exempting minors from the prohibition 
against age discrimination); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/1-103 (2018) (excepting apprentice-
ship programs from the definition of age as, “the chronological age of a person who is at least 40 
years old”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:2231 (2018) (stating that the age discrimination prohibitions “in 
connection with public accommodations shall be limited to individuals who are at least forty years 
of age”); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-304 (2017) (permitting consideration of age when “based on 
reasonable grounds”); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-02 (West 2018) (defining age as at least 
forty years); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659A.406 (2018) (limiting the prohibition against age dis-
crimination to persons at least 18 years of age); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3902 (2018) (permitting 
age distinctions “where the program, law or activity constitutes a legitimate exercise of powers of 
the Commonwealth for the general health, safety and welfare of the population at large”); see also 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02 (2018) (permitting mandatory retirement ages for police and 
firefighters). 
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programs, also contain language barring age discrimination.56 Local ordi-
nances can also contain protections for older people, including protections 
against age discrimination.57 
There is no case law examining how state and local law might limit the 
use of age-based criteria, and there is little scholarly analysis of the topic. 
The one exception is a student comment criticizing a recent Oklahoma stat-
ute for potentially requiring “transplant centers in Oklahoma to perform 
organ transplants on patients who may not only fail to qualify as candidates 
but also to survive the procedure itself due to age or illness.”58 The statute 
proscribes medical decisions that are grounded in any view that regards 
“extending the life of an elderly, disabled, or terminally ill individual as of 
lower value than extending the life of an individual who is younger, non-
disabled, or not terminally ill.”59 A distributive justice approach, however, 
need not claim that extending an elderly person’s life has “lower value” for 
that person or for society; instead—analogous to some arguments for pro-
gressive taxation—it can claim that an elderly person has less need for an 
extra year of life and therefore less entitlement to that year, even though the 
year has the same value for her as it would for someone else.60 It therefore 
may not fall afoul of the statute. Additionally, the statute’s placement of age 
alongside disability suggests that the statute’s aim is to prohibit the assign-
ment of a lower “quality weight” to life extension for elderly or disabled 
people, rather than to prohibit the consideration of how many years some-
                                                                                                                           
 56 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3005 (2018) (stating that domestic violence service 
providers may not receive federal funds if they discriminate on the basis of age); HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 334E-2 (2018) (providing that patients in psychiatric facilities are not to be subject 
to “discriminatory treatment” due to age); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 148F.17 (2018) (requiring provid-
ers who “teach, evaluate, supervise, or conduct research” to not “discriminate on the basis of . . . 
age” against research subjects); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 439.994 (2017) (prohibiting age discrim-
ination in any “sterile hypodermic device program”); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 659.875 (2018) 
(prohibiting age discrimination by “any health benefit plan issued or delivered in this state”); S.C. 
CODE ANN. § 44-69-80 (2018) (prohibiting age discrimination by home health agencies “in the 
recruitment, location of patient, acceptance or provision of goods and services to patients or poten-
tial patients”). 
 57 See Israel Doron & Kim Dayton, “Thinking Locally”: Law, Aging, and Municipal Gov-
ernment: Findings from a National Survey, 21 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 365, 372 (2012) (dis-
cussing more than one thousand local ordinances that potentially implicated rights of the elderly). 
 58 Kendra Norman, Comment, Live and Let Die: The Consequences of Oklahoma’s Nondis-
crimination in Treatment Act, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 585, 608 (2016) (arguing that the statute prevents 
medical providers from making important quality of life “value judgment[s]”). The statute was 
based on model legislation written by an interest group, the National Right to Life Committee, 
which suggests that similar statutes are likely to be proposed elsewhere. See id. at 600. 
 59 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 3090.3 (2018). 
 60 I distinguish the value of additional life to a person from the entitlement that person has to 
additional years of life at infra note 190 and accompanying text. 
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one has enjoyed.61 The statute also does not require that providers be indif-
ferent to the number of years a patient can gain from treatment. Finally, the 
statute’s reference to “elderly” individuals, rather than to age as such, 
makes it inapplicable to age-based criteria that differentiate younger people 
from middle-aged people.62 
Going beyond the distinctive language of the Oklahoma statute, most 
state statutes prohibit age “discrimination,” rather than using the broader 
Age Act language that prohibits exclusion from programs or denial of bene-
fits. This language leaves more room for distributive justice considerations 
because not all cases where age-based criteria disadvantage a patient neces-
sarily constitute age discrimination.63 Recognizing a difference between 
disadvantage and invidious discrimination could harmonize state statutory 
law with equal protection law, which I discuss next. 
B. Equal Protection 
Discussions of a constitutional prohibition on age discrimination have 
focused on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.64 In 1976, 
in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, the Supreme Court deter-
mined that older adults are not a group akin to racial or national-origin 
groups, observing that age discrimination—even against the elderly—has 
not been as severe as racial discrimination, and that “old age does not define 
a ‘discrete and insular’ group . . . in need of ‘extraordinary protection from 
the majoritarian political process,’” but only “marks a stage that each of us 
will reach if we live out our normal span.”65 Accordingly, the Court con-
                                                                                                                           
 61 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 3090. 
 62 See id. 
 63 Cf. Persad, supra note 21, at 147–48 (differentiating between various concerns including: 
(1) varying treatment of individuals with differing health statuses; (2) whether “designs systemati-
cally disadvantage” people due to their belonging to an “illness-based class”; and (3) whether 
insurance disadvantages people who belong to a “non-illness-based class[]”). 
 64 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that “[n]o state shall make or enforce any law 
which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”). Be-
yond the Fourteenth Amendment itself, there is a small scholarly literature, but no published prec-
edent, concerning whether the Twenty-Sixth Amendment’s prohibition on abridging the voting 
rights of people over eighteen should be “read back” into the Fourteenth Amendment’s antidis-
crimination guarantee to decisively establish a prohibition on age discrimination. Compare Eric S. 
Fish, Response, Originalism, Sex Discrimination, and Age Discrimination, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE 
ALSO 1, 2–3 (2012), http://texaslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Fish-91-TLRSA-
1.pdf [https://perma.cc/AU6U-X426] (rejecting the view that the Twenty-Sixth Amendment sup-
ports a prohibition on age discrimination outside the voting rights context), with Michael C. Dorf, 
Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 995 (2002) (arguing that the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment supports the position that “age discrimination should be presumptively invalid”). 
 65 Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976) (per curiam). 
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cluded that, under the Equal Protection Clause, classifications that disad-
vantage older people do not require the strict scrutiny applied to classifica-
tions on the basis of race or national origin, but rather only require a ration-
al basis.66 Individualized assessment of older people’s capacities is not re-
quired.67 
In dissent, Justice Marshall agreed that age-based classifications differ 
from race- or sex-based classifications because older people are not “isolat-
ed in society, and discrimination against them is not pervasive but is cen-
tered primarily in employment.”68 Focusing on the importance of employ-
ment, he would have concluded that “to sustain the legislation appellants 
must show a reasonably substantial interest and a scheme reasonably close-
ly tailored to achieving that interest.”69 Marshall also would have concluded 
that automatic employment termination on the basis of age, without indi-
vidualized testing, is irrational.70 
The Supreme Court has subsequently reaffirmed and extended the ap-
proach taken in Murgia, most recently by adopting the position that “[s]tates 
may discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth 
Amendment if the age classification in question is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.”71 This language makes explicit that a rational ba-
sis test applies to age-based criteria that disadvantage middle-aged or 
younger people, as well as to those that disadvantage older people. 
Some commentators have asserted that Murgia and its progeny rest on 
factual mistakes or invidious stereotypes and should be overturned.72 More 
innovatively, Nina Kohn has argued that the use of age-based criteria in spe-
cific contexts, such as medical decision making, can be subject to heightened 
legal scrutiny even if Murgia and subsequent cases remain good law.73 Kohn 
asserts that the “case for heightened scrutiny in the health care context would 
                                                                                                                           
 66 Id. at 314–15. 
 67 Id. at 316. 
 68 Id. at 325 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. at 327 (finding “no reason at all for automatically terminating those officers who reach 
the age of 50; indeed, that action seems the height of irrationality”). 
 71 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000). 
 72 See Julie R. Steiner, Comment, Age Classifications and the Fourteenth Amendment: Is the 
Murgia Standard Too Old to Stand?, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 263, 293 (1995); see also Nina 
A. Kohn, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Age Discrimination: A Challenge to a Decades-Old 
Consensus, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 213, 247 (2010). 
 73 See Kohn, supra note 72, at 260. Kohn relies on the work of another scholar, Julie Nice, 
who identifies a “third strand” of equal protection case law that addresses situations where im-
portant rights are denied on the basis of “class-based distinctions,” such as age distinctions. See 
Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal Protection Jurisprudence: Recognizing the 
Co-Constitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1209, 1211 (articulating the 
“third strand” approach to equal protection analysis). 
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be most compelling where the government uses age-based classifications to 
deny older adults the right to obtain a certain procedure regardless of need or 
ability to pay,” as with a hypothetical “policy that stated that no person over a 
certain age could receive a certain type of organ transplant regardless of his or 
her need or ability to pay.”74 Heightened scrutiny of such a policy is warrant-
ed because “the government would be denying a very important interest (that 
in a vital organ) to a very vulnerable population (older people in need of such 
an organ).”75 This approach, as Kohn observes, combines equal protection 
and fundamental rights analyses. Kohn likewise argues that age-based reim-
bursement criteria for back surgery should receive heightened scrutiny, 
though she acknowledges that the case here is weaker.76 Kohn concedes, 
however, that age-based criteria for the provision of financial benefits would 
likely not receive heightened scrutiny.77 This conclusion would support the 
constitutionality of age-rated insurance premiums. 
I disagree with Kohn’s defense of applying heightened scrutiny to age-
based medical criteria. Although receiving a vital organ may be crucial to a 
particular individual’s survival, federal constitutional law does not recog-
nize the right to receive medical treatment—in contrast to the right to re-
fuse—as fundamental. As Kohn admits, the Supreme Court has “never rec-
ognized access to health care as a fundamental right” and, moreover, has 
expressly rejected the equation of rights to refuse medical treatment with 
rights to receive such treatment.78 The same is true in lower federal courts 
and in state courts.79 Courts have also rejected the effort to use Roe v. Wade 
                                                                                                                           
 74 Kohn, supra note 72, at 273–74. 
 75 Id. at 274; cf. Basile J. Uddo, The Withdrawal or Refusal of Food and Hydration as Age 
Discrimination: Some Possibilities, 2 ISSUES L. & MED. 39, 58–59 (1986) (arguing that Murgia’s 
use of a rational basis test may not apply to the denial of life-prolonging health care because “[a] 
compelling argument can be made that a person’s right to his own life, and the medical treatment 
necessary to sustain it, is as fundamental as a right can be,” and that therefore “the Court may 
scrutinize more closely challenged government actions that could result in someone’s death”). 
 76 Kohn, supra note 72, at 275. 
 77 Id. at 276 (considering a hypothetical in which “the government reversed current policy and 
provided social security payments to the middle-aged instead of the old”). 
 78 Id. at 273; see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 725–26 (1997) (rejecting the view 
that “the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment could be somehow transmuted into a right to 
assistance in committing suicide”); cf. O. Carter Snead, Response, Unenumerated Rights and the 
Limits of Analogy: A Critique of the Right to Medical Self-Defense, 120 HARV. L. REV. F. 1, 2 
(2009), https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/snead.pdf [https://perma.cc/JXR5-
VYVX] (rejecting a fundamental constitutional right to “medical self-defense”). These arguments 
apply even more strongly in the case of non-lifesaving treatment. 
 79 See Mitchell v. Clayton, 995 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 1993) (observing that “most federal 
courts have held that a patient does not have a constitutional right to obtain a particular type of 
treatment or to obtain treatment from a particular provider if the government has reasonably pro-
hibited that type of treatment or provider”); Mont. Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State, 286 P.3d 1161, 
1166 (Mont. 2012) (concluding that “in pursuing health, an individual does not have a fundamen-
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and related cases that focus on family-planning and reproductive rights to 
support a general right to receive the medical care of one’s choice.80 Addi-
tionally, older people in need of an organ and younger people in need of an 
organ are equally vulnerable to the threat of death from organ failure, which 
indicates that transplantation is an area of life where older people are not at 
special risk.81 
The scant precedent on age-based criteria for transplantation provides 
no affirmative support for Kohn’s theory that heightened scrutiny is war-
ranted. The only published case considering an equal protection suit by a 
plaintiff seeking organ transplantation affirmed the dismissal of the plain-
tiff’s complaint as factually unsubstantiated, without settling the question of 
how age discrimination law applies to organ allocation.82 In a more recent, 
highly publicized case, lawyers for ten-year-old Sarah Murnaghan asserted 
that organ transplantation rules that limit children’s ability to receive organs 
from adult donors constitutes age discrimination.83 Murnaghan secured a 
temporary restraining order and obtained a transplant soon afterward, but 
the restraining order did not resolve the substantive legal issues.84 
Courts’ refusal to apply heightened scrutiny to transplantation decisions 
is consistent with the distributive justice approach I defend. If courts viewed 
the right to receive scarce treatments like transplants as fundamental, this 
would make systematic allocation of scarce medical resources—such as the 
UNOS allocation systems for organs—difficult to employ.85 Recognizing a 
fundamental right to refuse medical treatments, in contrast, does not present 
                                                                                                                           
tal affirmative right of access to a particular drug”); see also Smith v. Shalala, 954 F. Supp. 1, 3 
(D.D.C. 1996) (rejecting the view that the “government has an affirmative obligation to set aside 
its regulations in order to provide dying patients access to experimental medical treatments”). 
 80 People v. Younghanz, 156 Cal. App. 3d 811, 816 (Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting an analogy to 
family-planning cases and observing that “[t]he right to seek a particular form of medical treat-
ment as a cure for one’s illness, however, has not been recognized as a fundamental right in Cali-
fornia”). Contra Kohn, supra note 72, at 273 & n.291 (citing family-planning cases as examples 
of legally protected health care decisions). 
 81 Cf. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 325 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (differentiating employment discrim-
ination from other discrimination on the basis of age). 
 82 Wheat v. Massachusetts, 994 F.2d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 1993). 
 83 Scott D. Halpern, Turning Wrong into Right: The 2013 Lung Allocation Controversy, 159 
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 358, 358–59 (2013) (describing Sarah Murnaghan’s case). Interestingly, 
Murnaghan’s attorneys omitted any Age Act claims from their pleadings, focusing solely on con-
stitutional equal protection claims and other administrative law claims. See Complaint for a Tem-
porary Restraining Order and Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relief at 16–18, Murnaghan 
v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-CV-03083 (E.D. Pa. June 5, 2013), https://www.
courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.paed.477750.1.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/BU8L-KXXH]. 
 84 See Supplemental Memorandum at 1–2, Murnaghan, No. 13-CV-03083, https://www.court
listener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.paed.477750.12.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9T3U-R5HS]. 
 85 See infra notes 140–153 and accompanying text. 
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similar distributive issues, because refusals do not generate competing dis-
tributive claims to a scarce good. 
A rational basis test that emphasizes that the state’s interest must be le-
gitimate—the approach taken in in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Center—is a better way of reviewing age-based criteria than the heightened 
scrutiny for which Kohn advocates.86 In Cleburne, the Court struck down a 
city council decision that treated a home for mentally disabled adults disad-
vantageously, concluding that the city’s decision responded primarily to the 
negative attitudes of community members toward mentally disabled people, 
and that “mere negative attitudes, or fear” could not be used to support the 
council’s decision.87 The Court, however, declined to conclude that classifi-
cations disadvantaging the mentally disabled should receive heightened 
scrutiny in general.88 In doing so, the Cleburne Court read Murgia as sup-
porting the principle that legislative consideration of personal characteris-
tics such as age in furtherance of distributive purposes should not be subject 
to heightened scrutiny.89 This principle is consonant with the distributive 
justice approach. 
Notably, the Cleburne approach, unlike Kohn’s approach, does not de-
pend on the importance of the right at issue, but on the irrationality of the 
government’s justification for denying the right. The Cleburne approach 
would therefore be more likely to protect Francisco’s interest in not being 
subjected to substandard nursing care, or Gail’s interest in not being denied 
infertility treatment on the basis that it is “unnatural,” than to vindicate Char-
lotte’s efforts to obtain an organ transplant, even though transplantation is a 
lifesaving intervention. More generally, the Cleburne approach favors the 
overturning of decisions on an as-applied basis over the complete rejection 
of a developed legal framework. 
Many state constitutions also contain equal protection provisions: 
some closely parallel the federal Constitution, and others substantially di-
                                                                                                                           
 86 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
 87 Id. at 448. 
 88 Id. at 469–70.  
 89 Id. at 441–42. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Justice White stated: 
The lesson of Murgia is that where individuals in the group affected by a law have 
distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the State has the authority to im-
plement, the courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system 
and with our respect for the separation of powers to closely scrutinize legislative 
choices as to whether, how, and to what extent those interests should be pursued. 
Id. 
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verge.90 State courts interpreting these provisions in age discrimination con-
texts have typically followed the Murgia approach, frequently with little 
explicit acknowledgement that state constitutional interpretation need not 
follow the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, but 
sometimes on the basis that the reasoning in Murgia and its progeny is per-
suasive.91 Some state courts, however, particularly those interpreting provi-
sions that differ meaningfully from the Equal Protection Clause, have ap-
plied more searching scrutiny to certain age-based classifications.92 Another 
state court has invalidated age-based criteria as irrational even under a ra-
tional basis test.93 
This willingness to invalidate some age-based criteria as irrational 
leaves open the possibility—which I discuss in Part II.E—that there may in 
fact be a case for invalidation of age-based criteria that disadvantage 
younger, rather than older, people.94 
II. THE LEGALITY OF AGE-BASED CRITERIA:  
ANTIDISCRIMINATION PRINCIPLES 
In Part I, I argued that current law does not support a broad prohibition 
on the use of age-based criteria in medical decision making, although the 
lack of extensive precedent means that many questions remain unresolved. 
This description of the law does not settle whether such a broad prohibition 
should exist. The analysis of Part I might be read to indicate a need for new 
federal or state legislation; for regulatory or judicial interpretations that ex-
                                                                                                                           
 90 See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in State Constitutional Law, 34 RUT-
GERS L.J. 1013, 1014–17 (2003) (discussing the spectrum of equal protection provisions in state 
constitutions). 
 91 Shaman, supra note 90, at 1078 (stating that state courts usually follow the rational basis 
standard articulated in Murgia to evaluate claims of age-based discrimination); see, e.g., Landers 
v. Stone, 496 S.W.3d 370, 377 (Ark. 2016) (stating that age is not a suspect classification under 
the Equal Protection Clause); Nagle v. Bd. of Ed., 629 P.2d 109, 113 (Haw. 1981) (concluding 
that the rational basis test is the “proper” test to apply); Cruz v. Chevrolet Grey Iron, Div. of Gen. 
Motors Corp., 247 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Mich. 1976) (similar); O’Neil v. Baine, 568 S.W.2d 761, 
765 (Mo. 1978) (similar); cf. Shaman, supra note 90, at 1019 (observing that during the 1970s, 
“[i]n interpreting their own equality provisions,” many “state courts obediently followed the fed-
eral framework for putting the Equal Protection Clause into effect”). 
 92 See, e.g., Badgley v. Walton, 10 A.3d 469, 481 (Vt. 2010) (rejecting the rational basis 
standard for an age discrimination claim under the Vermont Constitution); cf. Power v. City of 
Providence, 582 A.2d 895, 901 & n.6 (R.I. 1990) (declining to decide the standard of scrutiny for 
an age discrimination claim under the Rhode Island Constitution). 
 93 Jaksha v. Butte-Silver Bow Cty., 214 P.3d 1248, 1254 (Mont. 2009) (concluding that the 
“age limitation of 34 years” for firefighters is not rational). 
 94 See infra notes 163–170 and accompanying text. Contra Kohn, supra note 72, at 276 (argu-
ing that “chronological age criteria that discriminate on the basis of younger age are . . . less likely 
to be granted heightened scrutiny than those that discriminate on the basis of old age”). 
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plicitly foreclose the use of age-based criteria; or even for federal or state 
constitutional amendments. Defending my contrary conclusion requires 
normative analysis. This normative analysis can also feed back into doctrine 
because age discrimination law relies on contested normative concepts like 
reasonableness, making normative analysis particularly relevant.95 Further-
more, the lack of case law applying many of the statutes discussed above to 
health care leaves ample room for doctrinal development. 
In this Part, I discuss five proposed limits on the consideration of age 
that reflect antidiscrimination concerns: 
1.  The animus/bias principle prohibits medical care decisions that rely on 
unjustifiable biases or animus. 
2.  The anticlassification principle takes the position that age is an imper-
missible group-based classification. 
3.  The individualized judgments principle rejects age-based criteria that 
use formulae, rather than individualized judgments, to decide what ben-
efits people receive. 
4.  The plus-factor principle prohibits the use of age as a sole factor, but 
permits its use alongside other factors. 
5.  The antisubordination principle takes the position that no person should 
be subordinated on the basis of age. 
I argue that the animus/bias principle can support the invalidation of some 
age-based criteria, and that the anticlassification principle is not applicable 
to age-based criteria. The other three principles are sometimes applicable to 
age-based criteria; however, they are better understood as parts of a broader 
account of distributive justice than as bright-line rules against using age-
based criteria. The antisubordination principle in particular bridges antidis-
crimination and distributive justice concerns. 
A. Age as a Trigger for Animus and Bias 
In a study of physician bias, Mary Crossley reviewed empirical evidence 
that physicians consider age when treating patients; Crossley reports that 
“[o]ne study found that among seriously ill, hospitalized adults, older patients 
were more likely than younger patients to have treatments such as surgery, 
dialysis and ventilator support withheld, even after adjusting for patients’ 
preferences for life-extending care.”96 Another survey of physicians that 
                                                                                                                           
 95 Cf. Michael S. Moore, Liberty and the Constitution, 21 LEGAL THEORY 156, 159 (2015) 
(arguing that judgments of reasonableness in law require normative analysis). 
 96 Mary Crossley, Infected Judgment: Legal Responses to Physician Bias, 48 VILL. L. REV. 
195, 231–32 (2003) (footnotes omitted). 
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Crossley discusses “revealed that a significant proportion of the respondents 
concurred in judgments to treat an older patient less aggressively than a 
younger patient, even when those patients’ likelihoods of survival were iden-
tical.”97 
Not all differential treatment is unjustified bias. In many cases, older 
patients’ prospect of benefit is drastically limited by their life expectancy. 
This remains true even if patients have the same likelihood of surviving a 
procedure or have equally strong preferences to receive care. A Florida 
court implicitly conceded this point when it approved, in the calculation of 
damages, the use of mortality tables that use age as a factor in predicting 
future life expectancy.98 Differential treatment can also be justified based on 
need rather than prospect of benefit: older patients have already experienced 
many years of life and are not in danger of dying young.99 
Many cases of differential treatment, however, are grounded in unjusti-
fiable biases. I classify these biases into three categories: factual mistake, 
nonrational bias, and animus.100 I also discuss a fourth basis for differential 
treatment, which appeals to controversial conceptions of a good human life. 
Factual mistakes are the simplest to identify and criticize: they are well-
captured by Crossley’s concern about physicians relying on an “erroneous 
belief that older patients are more likely to suffer poor outcomes or are less 
likely to benefit from aggressive treatment.”101 Factual mistakes lead to worse 
medical and societal outcomes, and efforts to counter their effects through 
regulation and education are normatively warranted. A good example of a 
factual mistake in a legal context would be a mathematical error in a docu-
ment used to ground a policy: even under rational basis review, mathematical 
errors are proper grounds for reversal.102 
                                                                                                                           
 97 See id. 
 98 Sainz v. Bucelo, 527 So. 2d 911, 912 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding admissible “mor-
tality tables which considered the health, age and physical condition of the 64 year-old [plaintiff], 
giving him a projected life expectancy of 13.9 years”). 
 99 Cf. Martínez-Álvarez v. Ryder Mem’l Hosp., Inc., No. 09-2038, 2010 WL 3431653, at *7 
(D.P.R. Aug. 31, 2010) (asserting that although “losing a family member before their time is al-
ways tragic, losing a parent of a somewhat advanced age is different from cases involving the 
untimely death of a young parent or the death of a child”). 
 100 The categories of nonrational bias and animus overlap, but some nonrational bias involves 
no animus, and some animus operates at a subconscious rather than conscious level. See Amelia 
M. Wirts, Note, Discriminatory Intent and Implicit Bias: Title VII Liability for Unwitting Discrim-
ination, 58 B.C. L. REV. 809, 830, 833–35 (2017) (describing unconscious bias and how animus 
may not be evident even when there is bias). 
 101 Crossley, supra note 97, at 232 (emphasis added). 
 102 Cf. Holmes v. Farmer, 475 A.2d 976, 987–88 (R.I. 1984) (describing a policy grounded in 
mathematical error as not supported by a “legitimate state purpose”). 
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A second category of unjustifiable biases are nonrational responses 
based on age. Psychological studies indicate that information about age of-
ten induces implicit, unconscious responses (sometimes termed “implicit 
biases”).103 Some nonrational or preconscious responses—like the instinc-
tive urge to assist a crying child—are normatively justifiable upon reflection 
because they serve legitimate individual or societal interests.104 But other im-
plicit biases, in particular reflexive disgust or aversion toward members of 
an outgroup, are more difficult to normatively justify.105 One way of coun-
tering implicit bias is to use a guideline or checklist that slows down and 
channels deliberation.106 In Part II.C, I argue that this concern supports the 
use of systematic frameworks rather than individualized judgments. 
A third category of unjustifiable biases comprises age-based criteria 
that are justified by bare moral disapproval, hostility, or revulsion, such as 
the refusal to provide infertility treatments to post-menopausal women be-
cause bearing children after menopause is “unnatural.”107 A rejection of an-
imus or bare revulsion arguably undergirds several Supreme Court prece-
dents, from Department of Agriculture v. Moreno to United States v. Wind-
sor, that strike down policies that disadvantage specific groups as irrational 
without invoking heightened scrutiny.108 Normative justifications for the 
rejection of disgust or bare moral disapproval as a basis for law often rely 
on John Stuart Mill’s “harm principle,” which rejects prohibitions on con-
duct that imposes no harm on others.109 
                                                                                                                           
 103 See, e.g., Jordan R. Axt, Charles R. Ebersole & Brian A. Nosek, The Rules of Implicit 
Evaluation by Race, Religion, and Age, 25 PSYCH. SCI. 1804, 1809–1812 (2014) (reporting the 
results of a study in which the participants implicitly ranked children highest, followed by young 
adults, middle-aged adults, and lastly older adults); cf. Marshall B. Kapp, De Facto Health-Care 
Rationing by Age: The Law Has No Remedy, 19 J. LEGAL MED. 323, 333 (1998) (discussing 
health care providers’ “unconscious bias and prejudice regarding the elderly”). 
 104 See Govind Persad, When, and How, Should Cognitive Bias Matter to Law? 32 LAW & 
INEQ. 31, 43–58 (2014); see also Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The 
Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 
1996–2002 (2002). 
 105 See Persad, supra note 104, at 60–61 (discussing “indefensible” implicit biases). 
 106 See L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 
98 IOWA L. REV. 293, 307 (2012). 
 107 Reynolds, supra note 9, at 295. 
 108 See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 770–72 (2013) (concluding that the exclusion 
of same-sex couples from marriage was rooted in animus and bias); U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. More-
no, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (asserting that statute was rooted in bias against “hippies”); Carpenter, 
supra note 14, at 230–31 (noting that both Moreno and Windsor use anti-animus principles, allow-
ing for greater legislative decision making). 
 109 See FEINBERG, supra note 22, ch. 30 (discussing the “harm principle” in both law and 
moral philosophy); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 22–23 (1871) (arguing that “the only pur-
pose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others”); cf. Carlos A. Ball, The Proper Role of Morality in 
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In recent work, the psychologist Jonathan Haidt argued that some indi-
viduals recognize both disgust and ingroup preference as proper founda-
tions for moral judgments.110 Haidt’s work might be used to argue that dis-
gust and ingroup loyalty can be proper bases for law, and therefore to sup-
port, for instance, the refusal of reproductive medical treatments to older 
women or the denial of optimal nursing care to “repulsive” elderly patients.111 
This strategy faces two problems. First, Haidt’s psychological research de-
scribes what people believe; it does not tell us what is right or wrong.112 
That many people ground moral judgments in disgust responses does not 
make doing so correct. There are compelling reasons to reject disgust as a 
proper basis for moral judgments.113 Additionally, even if disgust were a 
defensible basis for moral judgments, it might remain an inappropriate basis 
for legislation.114 
Age-based criteria that are justified by appeal to controversial concep-
tions of what a good human life consists of, rather than to either distributive 
justice principles or psychological biases, present perhaps the most chal-
lenging questions.115 An exemplar of such a justification is Daniel Calla-
han’s defense of an age cutoff for access to life-extending care even in the 
absence of scarcity. Callahan’s argument appeals to a conception of the 
proper meaning of old age, rather than to concerns about harms to older 
patients, distributive unfairness to younger patients, or overall societal ben-
                                                                                                                           
State Policies on Sexual Orientation and Intimate Relationships, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 81, 93 (2011) (distinguishing “two . . . types of morality-based government actions: 
those grounded in empirical evidence and those that are not”); Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the 
Rule of Law: Should Bare Assertions of “Public Morality” Qualify as Legitimate Government 
Interests for the Purposes of Equal Protection Review?, 87 GEO. L.J. 139, 140 (1998) (stating that 
“‘[b]are public morality’ arguments defend a law by asserting a legitimate government interest in 
prohibiting or encouraging certain human behavior without any empirical connection to goods 
other than the alleged good of eliminating or increasing . . . the behavior at issue”). 
 110 See Courtney Megan Cahill, Abortion and Disgust, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 427 
& n.100 (2013) (reviewing Haidt’s research). See generally JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS 
MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION (2012) (presenting empiri-
cal research on moral judgment). 
 111 See, e.g., Maggie Gallagher & William C. Duncan, The Kennedy Doctrine: Moral Disagree-
ment and the “Bare Desire to Harm,” 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 949, 962 (2014) (using Haidt’s 
view to support laws that exclude same-sex couples from marriage). 
 112 Cf. Persad, supra note 104, at 64–67 (arguing that whether a belief is defensible or corro-
sive is a question that cannot be answered by behavioral science alone). 
 113 See generally MARTHA NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME, AND 
THE LAW (2004). 
 114 Cahill, supra note 110, at 454–55. 
 115 See generally JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993) (exploring “public reason,” 
which proposes limits on the use of “comprehensive” religious and philosophical doctrines in 
political argument and public policy). 
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efits.116 Approaches like Callahan’s have been criticized for grounding mor-
al claims in controversial conceptions of a good life that are anathema to 
many people in a pluralistic society.117 Some have argued that law similarly 
should not be based on such controversial conceptions.118 
In contrast to Callahan’s view, the lifetime justice approach I advocate 
in Part III does not appeal to any controversial conception of a good human 
life. Instead, it proposes a framework for understanding and balancing 
widely accepted values, such as providing greater benefits and giving pri-
ority to the least advantaged. Although the interpretation and ordering of 
these values is likely to be controversial, the values themselves are not.119 
B. Age as a Forbidden Classification 
As the medical literature discussed in Part I indicates, age is frequently a 
reliable proxy—though imperfect, as all proxies are—for the prospect of 
medical benefit.120 Nevertheless, some have taken the position that age is a 
fundamentally objectionable group classification, akin to race.121 This stance 
represents what legal scholars have called an anticlassification approach, 
which regards age as a “forbidden trait” whose consideration is proscribed in 
the provision of health care.122 Anticlassification approaches are willing to 
accept some social costs to avoid forbidden classifications—to repurpose 
                                                                                                                           
 116 See CALLAHAN, supra note 26. 
 117 See, e.g., Jecker, supra note 26, at 64–65 (criticizing Daniel Callahan and Alasdair Mac-
Intyre for relying on the argument that older people’s requests for medical treatment are funda-
mentally unwise, rather than on the argument that their requests should be assigned a lower priori-
ty when resources are scarce). 
 118 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Public Legal Reason, 92 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1469 (2006); cf. 
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992) (“Some of us as individuals 
find abortion offensive to our most basic principles of morality, but that cannot control our deci-
sion. Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”). But see 
David Enoch, The Disorder of Public Reason, 124 ETHICS 141, 141 (2013) (arguing against “pub-
lic reason” approaches). 
 119 Cf. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 765, 777 (1997) 
(arguing that policies should not be grounded in controversial conceptions of the good life). 
 120 See Crossley, supra note 96, at 204 (noting that “a committee of the Institute of Medicine 
took the stance that demographic characteristics may sometimes be reliable proxies for factors 
such as patient preferences or anticipated outcomes of care”). 
 121 See Schuck, supra note 15, at 30, 50–53, 82 & n.272 (providing examples); see also Ev-
ans, supra note 11, at 823 (analogizing age-based criteria to race- and sex-based criteria); Harris, 
supra note 11, at 375 (arguing that the “principle of equality applies as much in the face of dis-
crimination on the basis of chronological age . . . as it does to discrimination on the basis of gen-
der, race, and other arbitrary features”). 
 122 See Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimination Law, 
63 ALA. L. REV. 955, 960–67 (2011). Areheart’s article provides an excellent overview of this 
approach, its contrast with antisubordination approaches, and the extensive legal scholarship on 
antisubordination and anticlassification. 
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some of Seana Shiffrin’s terminology, anticlassification approaches accom-
modate (at public expense) people’s claim not to be categorized according to 
certain characteristics.123 
Employing anticlassification approaches requires providing a norma-
tive justification for limiting or forbidding the use of certain categories.124 I 
will argue that age differs from race and sex in important ways that make 
classification by age much less objectionable. One clear difference between 
age and these other categories, as is stated in Murgia and as I discuss in Part 
II.E, is that older age is not a basis for systematic subordination.125 Even 
under an anticlassification approach that does not rely on antisubordination 
considerations, age remains different from race or sex because age is not as 
conceptually or empirically central to individuals’ identities. Conceptually, 
race and gender serve to systematically structure many individuals’ long-
term life plans in a normatively defensible way.126 Even though religion is 
not always externally identifiable and can more easily change, it plays a 
similar role.127 In contrast, although the passage of time and the fact of ag-
ing certainly do structure our life plans, the transitory facts of age and age-
group membership lack the same long-term significance. There is also more 
evidence that race, gender, and religion are more subjectively important 
identities than age.128 Although age-correlated identities, such as “parent” 
or “retiree,” may be important, it is difficult to imagine someone regarding 
being fifty-three years old as central to their life plan or self-concept, and 
                                                                                                                           
 123 Cf. Shiffrin, supra note 18, at 236–45 (explaining that accommodation can impose costs 
on the public). 
 124 See Areheart, supra note 122, at 963 (stating that “[a]nticlassification principles . . . re-
quire normative input on the front end to determine what traits are, for decision-making purposes, 
forbidden traits”). 
 125 See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976) (per curiam) (concluding 
that “old age does not define a ‘discrete and insular’ group”); cf. Areheart, supra note 122, at 963 
(arguing that antisubordination principles can be used to establish which principles should be 
forbidden bases for classification). 
 126 See Anthony Appiah, “But Would That Still Be Me?” Notes on Gender, “Race,” Ethnicity, 
as Sources of “Identity,” 87 J. PHIL. 493, 499 (1990) (claiming that disregarding one’s race or 
gender amounts to “ignoring . . . social reality”). 
 127 See David A.J. Richards, Sexual Preference as a Suspect (Religious) Classification: An 
Alternative Perspective on the Unconstitutionality of Anti-Lesbian/Gay Initiatives, 55 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 491, 508 (1994) (stating that “[t]he constitutional protection of religion never turned on its 
putative immutable and salient character . . ., but on the traditional place of religion in the consci-
entious and reasonable formation of one’s moral identity in public and private life”). As a norma-
tive matter, as opposed to a description of current legal doctrine, Richards’ argument also offers a 
compelling case for the centrality of sexual orientation. See id. (arguing that “normative claims by 
lesbian and gay persons today have exactly the same ethical and constitutional force” as claims 
grounded in religious identity). 
 128 Kay Deaux, Reconstructing Social Identity, 19 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 4, 10 
(1993) (discussing empirical research). 
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only marginally easier to imagine someone regarding being “in their fifties” 
in that way. 
Another difference between age and race or sex is that people move 
through age categories over time.129 Further, age changes inexorably, unlike 
characteristics such as economic status or geographical location that com-
monly change over time but are not guaranteed to do so.130 Aging is also a 
continuous process, rather than a transition between discrete categories.131 
The inexorableness of aging might be used, however, in defense of an 
anticlassification approach: the process of growing older—unlike moving 
geographically or becoming wealthier—is entirely outside our control.132 
That age is outside our control may explain why some case law classifies 
age as immutable—although age mutates, it is not mutable by us.133 It might 
also support a “luck egalitarian” or “choice-sensitive” case against age-
based criteria, which takes the position that how individuals fare in society 
should depend solely or primarily on chosen characteristics.134 
The choice-sensitive approach faces at least three problems. First, when 
we consider individuals over their lifetimes rather than at a given moment, 
                                                                                                                           
 129 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Caterpillar Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1227 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Age is not a 
distinction that arises at birth. Nor is age immutable . . . .”); Norman Daniels, Justice Between 
Adjacent Generations: Further Thoughts, 16 J. POL. PHIL. 475, 475 (2008) (arguing that the inevi-
tability of aging, in part, merits different treatment of different age groups); Judith A. Howard, 
Social Psychology of Identities, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 367, 380 (2000); see also EEOC v. Univ. of 
Tex. Health Sci. Ctr., 710 F.2d 1091, 1097 (5th Cir. 1983) (Higginbotham, J., concurring) (observ-
ing that “race, sex, and national origin describe an immutable status while age is a dynamic pro-
gression”). 
 130 See United States v. Tsarnaev, 53 F. Supp. 3d 443, 449 (D. Mass. 2014) (“[A] person’s age 
is in a constant state of change. A 71 year old is a former 69 year old (and 30 year old) in a way, 
for example, that an African-American is not a former white person.”); Kubik v. Scripps Coll., 
173 Cal. Rptr. 539, 542 (Ct. App. 1981) (observing that although age is determined by one’s date 
of birth, everyone progressively grows older over time). 
 131 Goldstein v. Manhattan Indus., Inc., 758 F.2d 1435, 1442 (11th Cir. 1985) (noting that 
“age is a continuum” involving “subtle and relative” distinctions); cf. Adam J. Kolber, Smooth and 
Bumpy Laws, 102 CAL. L. REV. 655, 659–61 (2014) (distinguishing continuous from discrete 
variables in legal contexts). 
 132 See DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 314 (1st Cir. 1997) (listing age among the “im-
mutable characteristics that a person does not choose and cannot change”); cf. Tsarnaev, 53 F. 
Supp. 3d at 449 (stating that “[a]ge is immutable only in the sense that a person cannot change her 
age”). 
 133 United States v. Escalante, No. 92-10363, 1993 WL 97510, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 22, 1993) 
(characterizing age as immutable); Arnett v. Aspin, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1241 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (sim-
ilar); Travelers Indem. Co. of Am. v. Commonwealth, Ins. Dep’t, 440 A.2d 645, 646 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1981) (referencing “immutable characteristics such as age and race”). 
 134 Cf. Schuck, supra note 15, at 33 (discussing criticism of age-based criteria on the basis 
that age is something “over which the individual has no control and for which he or she therefore 
cannot be held morally responsible”). See generally Richard J. Arneson, Luck Egalitarianism 
Interpreted and Defended, 32 PHIL. TOPICS 1 (2004) (providing a survey of the extensive litera-
ture on this topic). 
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age-based classifications do not subject people to differential good or bad 
luck. Each person will benefit from these classifications at some point; for 
some people, the benefit is in the past, although for others, it is in the fu-
ture.135 Age-based criteria therefore differ from random allocations of bene-
fits and burdens, such as the draft lottery used for the Vietnam War, which 
give equal chances to participants but allow brute luck to affect how indi-
viduals fare over their lifetimes.136 Second, choice-based approaches face 
two pressing normative criticisms. One charges that choice-based accounts 
are too willing to abandon people who make unwise choices.137 The other 
argues that what counts as an appropriate basis for allocating benefits and 
burdens is underdetermined by the idea of choice-sensitivity because differ-
ent ways of understanding choice-sensitivity correspond to different rules 
for distribution.138 Although these objections question whether chosen char-
acteristics are fair criteria for assigning benefits and burdens, as opposed to 
establishing that unchosen characteristics like age can be fair, they put pres-
sure on the coherence of the choice-based account. Third, choice-sensitive 
accounts are often regarded as distinctively inappropriate for the distribu-
tion of health care.139 
C. Age and the Right to an Individualized Judgment 
Deciding who will receive an important medical benefit might seem to 
require an exhaustive, individualized examination of each candidate’s situa-
tion. This argument recalls an objection offered to lottery-based allocation, 
namely that an inherently insignificant factor—such as the matching of a 
name to a random number—should not be the sole determinant of a very 
                                                                                                                           
 135 A crucial and often-overlooked exception to the claim that everyone will benefit from age-
based classifications is that people who die young will not benefit from age-based classifications 
that benefit older people. See Daniels, supra note 129, at 475 n.2. But this exception does not 
support an anticlassificationist view; rather, it recommends the use of age-based criteria that favor 
younger people. I return to this issue in Parts II.E and III. See infra notes 168–247. 
 136 See SHLOMI SEGALL, HEALTH, LUCK, AND JUSTICE 45–57 (2010) (discussing “all-luck 
egalitarianism,” which objects even to fair lotteries). 
 137 Elizabeth S. Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 ETHICS 287, 296 (1999). 
 138 See generally Susan Hurley & Richard Arneson, Luck and Equality, 75 PROC. ARISTOTE-
LIAN SOC’Y 51 (2001) (discussing the ambiguity of choice-sensitivity). 
 139 See Oscar W. Clarke et al., Ethical Considerations in the Allocation of Organs and Other 
Scarce Medical Resources Among Patients, 155 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 29, 32–33 (1995) 
(critiquing the use of a patient’s contribution to a disease in health care resource allocation); E. 
Feiring, Lifestyle, Responsibility and Justice, 34 J. MED. ETHICS 33 (2008). But see SEGALL, supra 
note 136, at 74–86 (defending a luck egalitarian view that takes voluntary choices into account). 
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important outcome.140 Instead, it might seem that the exhaustiveness of the 
process should match the significance of the outcome. 
Although I agree in Part II.D that it can be important to consider mul-
tiple factors when making a health care decision, I disagree that a detailed, 
individualized judgment about a patient’s situation is required.141 As a de-
scriptive matter, the American legal system now agrees, at least where the 
distribution of benefits (as opposed to the imposition of burdens) is con-
cerned.142 During the brief heyday of the “irrebuttable presumption” doc-
trine, individuals excluded from a benefit on the basis of a categorical rule 
were entitled to make an individualized case for an exception.143 As a rele-
vant example, a policy that categorically excluded individuals over seventy-
five from organ transplantation would have violated the irrebuttable pre-
sumption doctrine, even if the policy was a rational effort to efficiently allo-
cate organs without generating administrative burden.144 Instead, each indi-
vidual denied an organ would be entitled to make a case for an exception. In 
contrast, after the demise of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, irrebut-
table presumptions based on age are broadly permitted.145 
Some have called for reviving the right to an individualized judgment, 
and the American Medical Association’s ethics guidelines defend the desir-
ability of individualized judgments in health care.146 Although a profession-
                                                                                                                           
 140 Cf. Carol Necole Brown, Casting Lots: The Illusion of Justice and Accountability in Prop-
erty Allocation, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 65, 70 n.10 (2005) (discussing the objection that “[l]ottery allo-
cation or decision-making undermines human dignity and diminishes the individual by attacking 
the very basis of individuality (that is, being considered as a person with attributes, rather than a 
cipher, in the decision process)”). 
 141 Accord Schuck, supra note 15, at 34–35 (stating that age categories can be easily adminis-
tered because age is “highly objective” and an “easily measured characteristic”); see also infra 
notes 154–161 and accompanying text.  
 142 See, e.g., Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 754, 772 (1975); see also Robert A. Kagan, 
Inside Administrative Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 816, 827 (1984) (noting that “[t]he courts are not 
ready to construct statutory or due process rights to individualized treatment when citizens com-
plain of overly mechanical application of regulations that are otherwise ‘rational’”). 
 143 James M. Binnall, Sixteen Million Angry Men: Reviving a Dead Doctrine to Challenge the 
Constitutionality of Excluding Felons from Jury Service, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 5–14 
(2009) (providing an overview of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine). 
 144 Cf. id. at 11–12 (discussing application of irrebuttable presumption doctrine to age-based 
classifications). 
 145 See Nagle v. Bd. of Ed., 629 P.2d 109, 119 (Haw. 1981) (permitting irrebuttable presump-
tion based on age); see also Palmer v. Ticcione, 576 F.2d 459, 463 (2d Cir. 1978) (upholding a 
statute mandating retirement of teachers at age seventy and observing that when “the statutory 
classification is sustainable as rationally based, then it should not fall because it might also be 
labeled a presumption”). 
 146 See, e.g., Emily Toler, Comment, “Without Good Cause”: The Case for a Standard-Based 
Approach to Determining Worker Qualification for Unemployment Benefits, 89 WASH. L. REV. 
559, 592–93 (2014) (arguing that “when people are governed by rigid rules, they have an im-
portant interest in proving that those rules do not adequately address their situations” and that 
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al norm of having physicians make individualized assessments of their pa-
tients’ needs rather than relying on population-based guidelines has both 
advantages and disadvantages, an enforceable legal right to individualized 
medical judgments presents more serious problems.147 Such a right would 
likely generate an explosion of litigation that undermines any effort to set 
coherent health care priorities across society. The recognition of enforceable 
fundamental rights to health has been criticized for producing such a result.148 
A recent commentary by a group of distinguished health policy schol-
ars, building on the work of the World Health Organization’s Consultative 
Group on Equity and Universal Health Coverage, rejects the idea that courts 
should be the arbiters of access to health care.149 They evaluate a hypothet-
ical system that involves “reliance on the judiciary to make decisions about 
specific individuals’ claims to services that were initially excluded from the 
government-provided package,” and conclude that judicial decision-making 
about access to health care has major disadvantages: (1) an inability to “sys-
tematically take account of cost-effectiveness” or clinical effectiveness, 
which leads to courts approving “expensive services that offer limited or 
highly uncertain benefits” and thereby reducing “the funds available to pro-
vide proven, more cost-effective services”; (2) exacerbating inequalities in 
access to health services, due to the financial and educational resources liti-
gation requires; and (3) being poorly placed to “weigh evidence of medical 
efficacy” or “evaluate the impact of an isolated decision on the fairness of 
resource allocation in a health system.”150 For these reasons, they conclude 
that “[p]riority setting by a dedicated institution—establishing an independ-
ent mechanism or body that sets priorities in an accountable and transparent 
                                                                                                                           
“where individual circumstances vary wildly and the need for benefits is often acute, it is theoreti-
cally unsound and fundamentally unfair to deny claimants the right to a truly individualized adju-
dication”); Clarke et al., supra note 139, at 31 (stating that “[w]hen a duration of benefit criterion 
is applied, patients should be assessed according to their own medical histories and prognoses, not 
aggregate statistics based on membership in a group”). Taken literally, this statement would pro-
hibit the use of age-based criteria for screening tests, as well as for transplantation, as these proce-
dures use age to assess patients’ prospect of benefit from screening or transplantation. 
 147 See R.E. Ashcroft, Current Epistemological Problems in Evidence Based Medicine, 30 J. 
MED. ETHICS 131, 132 (2004) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of individualized 
assessments and evidence-based guidelines). 
 148 See Govind Persad, The Medical Cost Pandemic: Why Limiting Access to Cost-Effective 
Treatments Hurts the Global Poor, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 559, 582–85 (2015) (summarizing evi-
dence). 
 149 Alex Voorhoeve et al., Three Case Studies in Making Fair Choices on the Path to Univer-
sal Health Coverage, 18 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. 11, 18–20 (2016). 
 150 Id. at 18–19; cf. Halpern, supra note 83, at 358 (criticizing the court’s intervention in the 
Sarah Murnaghan case on the basis that “legal and political leaders . . . neglected their responsibil-
ity to protect the interests of all potential patients” and “bent the rules in favor of a well-resourced 
family that generated enormous media attention”). 
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manner, based on explicit, reasonable criteria—is morally preferable” to 
individualized priority-setting by the judiciary.151 
An additional advantage of a formalized framework that employs ex-
plicit criteria over the use of individualized judgments is that a formalized 
framework can help to forestall the effects of implicit bias.152 The bias-
preventing value of a formalized framework suggests that courts should be 
more willing to scrutinize the individualized and informal use of age-based 
criteria, such as the practices of health care providers in a nursing home, 
than to disapprove the results of formalized frameworks like the UNOS 
transplantation guidelines.153 
D. Age as a “Plus Factor” 
The plus-factor approach permits the use of age in medical decision 
making alongside other factors, but prohibits its use as the sole factor.154 
The plus-factor approach is defended in the medical literature, and national 
policies, including the Age Act and the United Kingdom’s age discrimina-
tion laws, have been interpreted to support it.155 Some have interpreted an-
                                                                                                                           
 151 Voorhoeve et al., supra note 149, at 19. 
 152 See Erik J. Girvan, Wise Restraints?: Learning Legal Rules, Not Standards, Reduces the 
Effects of Stereotypes in Legal Decision-Making, 22 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 31, 33 (2016) 
(discussing study results); Antony Page & Michael J. Pitts, Poll Workers, Election Administration, 
and the Problem of Implicit Bias, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 33 n.180 (2009) (“[U]nconscious bias 
is more likely when a decision-maker is applying a standard rather than a bright-line rule.”). 
 153 See generally ORGAN PROCUREMENT & TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, PUBLIC COM-
MENT PROPOSAL: FRAMEWORKS FOR ORGAN DISTRIBUTION (2018) https://optn.transplant.hrsa.
gov/media/2565/geography_publiccomment_201808.pdf [https://perma.cc/EJH8-6CAR]. 
 154 Govind Persad, Alan Wertheimer & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Principles for Allocation of 
Scarce Medical Interventions, 373 LANCET 423, 423 (2009) (differentiating “insufficient” criteria 
for medical decision making, which are acceptable when used as one factor among many, from 
“flawed” criteria, which are categorically unacceptable). Plus-factor approaches regard age as an 
insufficient criterion. 
 155 See RUSSEL H. PATTERSON, REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDICIAL AF-
FAIRS: ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF AGE-BASED RATIONING OF HEALTH CARE 1, 4 (1989) (reason-
ing that “[i]f it is determined that rationing is necessary . . . choices based solely on chronological 
age are not acceptable”); Formica et al., supra note 41, at 40 (discussing the Office of Civil 
Rights’ interpretation of the Age Act to prohibit the use of age as a sole factor in transplant alloca-
tion); Kenneth Prager, Op-Ed, Response 2: Medical Care for the Elderly: Should Limits Be Set? 
10 VIRTUAL MENTOR 404, 408 (2008) (stating that age “should not be used as the sole criterion” 
to determine distribution of health care resources); Roman Romero-Ortuno & Diarmuid O’Shea, 
Fitness and Frailty: Opposite Ends of a Challenging Continuum! Will the End of Age Discrimina-
tion Make Frailty Assessments an Imperative?, 42 AGE & AGEING 279, 279 (2013) (observing that 
“[i]n the UK, from 1 October 2012, older people will have the right to sue if they have been de-
nied health and/or social care based on age alone”); cf. Eyal Katvan et al., Age Limitation for Or-
gan Transplantation: The Israeli Example, 46 AGE & AGEING 8, 10 (2016) (discussing the mi-
nority position in the Israeli committee on transplant allocation, which “argued that chronological 
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tidiscrimination provisions in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) as supporting 
a plus-factor position.156 Notably, the plus-factor approach has been adopted 
for race-based classifications in university admissions, which suggests that 
plus-factor approaches have appeal when a classification is normatively 
concerning but implementing it can produce substantial social benefits.157 
Despite the plus-factor approach’s popularity, the normative case for it 
is difficult to identify.158 Whenever a decision is a close call, many fac-
tors—including “plus factors”—are but-for causes, such that the decision 
would not have been reached had those factors not been considered.159 Fur-
thermore, the plus-factor approach only makes normative sense where a 
classification serves antisubordination goals, as I discuss next. It would be 
normatively intolerable to regard whiteness, for instance, as a “plus factor” 
for access to medical treatment, even alongside other criteria. 
A better argument for the plus-factor approach would look beyond an 
antidiscrimination paradigm toward an account of fair distribution.160 If dis-
tributing health resources fairly requires looking to multiple ethical values, 
then no single factor—whether age, prognosis, or severity of illness—will 
be sufficient on its own to resolve distributive questions.161 Plus-factor ap-
proaches will therefore frequently be warranted. Because assessing whether 
resources are distributed fairly requires considering the health care system 
                                                                                                                           
age should be considered as one, of many, allocation considerations,” rather than being—as the 
majority argued—entirely ignored). 
 156 See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Bedside Bureaucrats: Why Medicare Reform Hasn’t Worked, 
101 GEO. L.J. 519, 574 (2013) (reasoning that an ACA provision supports Medicare’s reliance on 
multiple factors); Persad, supra note 21, at 133 (arguing that an ACA provision permits considera-
tion of cost-effectiveness and level of disability to determine priority). 
 157 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003) (employing plus-factor approach); see Per-
sad, supra note 21, at 133–34 (discussing the plus-factor approach); cf. Areheart, supra note 122, 
at 963 n.32 (“Does a policy violate the anticlassification principle if group membership is one of 
several criteria?”). 
 158 See Eidelson, supra note 42, at 1644 (questioning “why . . . encasing age in a compound 
measure of longevity” should “redress, or even mitigate” concerns that age-based criteria are in-
vidiously discriminatory). 
 159 Id. (claiming that “even under the revised plan, there will still be candidates who would 
have qualified for a better kidney if they had been only one year younger”); cf. Ogden v. Bureau 
of Labor, 699 P.2d 189, 191 (Or. 1985) (“If the word ‘solely’ . . . were given its literal meaning, 
forbidden age discrimination would occur only if age were the ‘sole factor’ in an employment 
decision . . . . The commissioner is not bound to so limited a view of the law.”); Persad, supra note 
21, at 133–34 (discussing the challenges for the plus-factor approach). 
 160 See Schuck, supra note 15, at 84–93 (contrasting “allocative” and “nondiscrimination” 
approaches to social problems); cf. Mark Kelman, Market Discrimination and Groups, 53 STAN. 
L. REV. 833, 892 (2001) (contrasting “simple discrimination” with “reasonable accommodation” 
claims, and observing that the latter involve distributive issues). 
 161 See Persad et al., supra note 154, at 426 (arguing that “no principle is sufficient on its own 
to recognize all morally relevant considerations”). 
2019] The Legality of Age-Based Criteria in Health Care 921 
as a whole rather than each medical transaction individually, the use of age 
as a sole criterion may be appropriate in some circumstances, such as the 
provision of screening tests. I return to this issue in Part IV.162 
E. Age, Disadvantage, and Subordination 
An antisubordination approach to antidiscrimination, unlike an anti-
classification approach, aims fundamentally to forestall and remedy the op-
pression of disadvantaged groups.163 Accordingly, it countenances the use of 
classifications to remediate past subordination, or to prevent subordination 
by private actors.164 Although some argue that current Supreme Court prec-
edent disfavors antisubordination approaches, such approaches can possess 
a compelling link to fundamental values like equality of opportunity.165 
Antisubordination approaches, properly understood, do not disfavor 
the use of age-based criteria, and often even favor their use when they assist 
disadvantaged individuals. To understand how antisubordination approaches 
evaluate age-based criteria, it is useful to disentangle older age from the 
increased frailty that commonly accompanies it.166 Older age, absent frailty, 
is not inherently disadvantaging. Rather, given that enjoying more years of 
life is a valuable outcome, older age is an advantage akin to greater wealth. 
Accordingly, just as antisubordination approaches support special concern 
for poorer people, who are not guaranteed to become wealthier, they sup-
port special concern for younger people, who are not guaranteed to enjoy 
the years of life that older people have already enjoyed.167 Several authors 
rightly note that not all younger people will live to older ages, but mistaken-
ly conclude that age-based criteria that deny benefits to older people are 
therefore worse than those that disadvantage the young.168 This is mistaken: 
                                                                                                                           
 162 See infra notes 243–291 and accompanying text. 
 163 Areheart, supra note 122, at 965. 
 164 Id. at 964. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Cf. Rebecca S. Starr & Mihaela S. Stefan, Perioperative Assessment of and Care for the 
Elderly and Frail, 5 HOSP. MED. CLINICS 224, 231 (2016) (explaining that “[a]lthough the preva-
lence of frailty increases with age, people can age without frailty or can be frail without being 
old”). 
 167 Cf. Jensen v. Franchise Tax Bd., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 408, 414 (Ct. App. 2009) (“Wealth 
generally confers benefits, and does not require the special protections afforded to suspect clas-
ses.”). 
 168 See, e.g., Howard Eglit, Of Age and the Constitution, 57 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 859, 888–89 
(1981) (noting that dying young is a “worse alternative” to aging, but nonetheless arguing that 
“laws which impose disadvantages for being too old” are “permanently inescapable” for the old, 
and therefore more objectionable than laws that disadvantage younger people); John F. Kilner, 
Age as a Basis for Allocating Lifesaving Medical Resources: An Ethical Analysis, 13 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 405, 411 (1988) (arguing that age-based criteria are unfair because “many people 
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because living to an older age is a highly valued outcome, we should be 
especially concerned about age-based criteria for lifesaving medical treat-
ments that favor individuals who have already lived to an older age over 
individuals who are not guaranteed to do so. An antisubordination perspec-
tive also counsels concern about facially neutral rules that fail to address the 
disadvantage of dying at a younger age. Such rules include criteria for the 
distribution of life-saving resources, such as first-come, first-served ap-
proaches, that give equal chances to younger and older people despite the 
fact that older people have already accumulated more years of life.169 Ulti-
mately, although frailty sometimes provides a basis for special concern 
about the interests of older people, older age decreases their claim to addi-
tional life-extending treatment.170 
III. AN AFFIRMATIVE CASE FOR AGE-BASED CRITERIA 
Part II rejected a variety of arguments that the use of age-based criteria 
necessarily constitutes wrongful discrimination. This Part defends the claim 
that age-based criteria are not merely permissible, but normatively prefera-
ble. The normative considerations I identify apply to a variety of actors who 
make decisions about age-based criteria, including patients, providers, pub-
lic and private payers, and governments.171 These actors, however, are sub-
ject to other obligations that may pull in different directions from the age-
                                                                                                                           
are born with congenital, genetic, or environmental conditions which ensure that they will not live 
as long as most”); see also Felix v. Milliken, 463 F. Supp. 1360, 1373 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (“[I]t is 
interesting to note that while discrimination against the elderly at a particular age imposes a disa-
bility that is never removed, drawing lines that affect young people has only a temporary effect.”); 
cf. Michael K. Gusmano, Is It Reasonable to Deny Older Patients Treatment for Glioblastoma?, 
42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 183, 185 (2014) (claiming that young voters support “social insurance 
commitments” that assist the elderly because they will be recipients of such programs in the fu-
ture). 
 169 Cf. Javorsky v. W. Athletic Clubs, Inc., 195 Cal. Rptr. 3d 706, 718 (Ct. App. 2015) (hold-
ing that a discount for customers 18 to 29 years of age was not wrongful age discrimination be-
cause of evidence that individuals in that age range “have a lower economic position than persons 
age 30 and older”). Contra Eglit, supra note 168, at 905 (arguing that “the unfairness of depriva-
tion imposed because of an immutable characteristic is tempered by the fact that youngsters will 
outgrow their age-based disabilities”). 
 170 See infra notes 202–209 and accompanying text. The nonabandonment principle proposed 
in Part III.C.1 can be seen as a response to frailty. See infra notes 183–209 and accompanying 
text.  
 171 Cf. Dan W. Brock, Ethical Issues in the Use of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for the Prioriti-
zation of Health Care Resources, in MAKING CHOICES IN HEALTH: WHO GUIDE TO COST-
EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 289, 291 (T. Tan-Torres Edejer et al. eds. 2003), http://www.who.int/
choice/publications/p_2003_generalised_cea.pdf [https://perma.cc/MJX4-LY3U] (stating that 
research on “substantive issues of equity in health care . . . should inform the deliberations” of 
decisionmakers using fair procedures to make health policy choices). 
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related considerations I identify. For instance, a provider may regard her 
obligations to specific patients or her own conception of professional integ-
rity as prior to societal considerations: a geriatrician may provide expensive 
treatments to her own patients even if the money spent on these treatments 
would be better spent, from a societal perspective, on other physicians’ 
younger patients.172 In contrast, a societal decisionmaker (like a legislator) 
should regard societal justifications as paramount: although a patient or 
provider may promote her own interests or those of her “nearest and dear-
est” at the expense of the greater good, a legislator may not. 
A. Patient-Based Justifications 
Turn first to patient-based justifications. These should be normatively 
desirable when they improve the health of most older patients, even if they 
do not improve each older person’s health. Consider the example of Eric, 
from the Introduction.173 Most people over seventy-five will be better off if 
doctors do not recommend colonoscopies to them. But some people over 
seventy-five—perhaps those with particularly aggressive cancers that would 
have responded well to treatment—will be worse off. Yet, given the need 
for some default rule, not recommending colonoscopies is the correct one to 
adopt, because the alternative—recommending testing—would leave a 
greater number of patients worse off. Where we must choose between help-
ing more people and helping fewer, giving the smaller group an equal 
chance at assistance, rather than immediately assisting the larger group, is 
normatively untenable.174 The lesson of this example is that not all deci-
sions that disadvantage some people on the basis of group membership un-
fairly subordinate them.175 A policy that helps more people should not be 
regarded as on a par with one that helps fewer people merely because the 
two policies help different people. 
                                                                                                                           
 172 See the discussion in Mark A. Hall, Rationing Health Care at the Bedside, 69 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 693, 703–05 & nn.31–32 (1994). Hall observes that a common view, which he rejects, “ad-
vocates that from the physician’s perspective literally any marginal medical benefit, no matter 
how small, is worth absolutely any price because doctors in their role as healers should behave as 
if each of our lives is priceless.” Id. at 705. 
 173 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 174 See David Wasserman & Alan Strudler, Can a Nonconsequentialist Count Lives?, 31 
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71, 71–73 (2003) (explaining the consequentialist proposition that numbers 
have moral significance); cf. Daniel Sharp & Joseph Millum, Prioritarianism for Global Health 
Investments: Identifying the Worst Off, 35 J. APPLIED PHIL. 112, 118–19 (2018) (providing exam-
ples). But see John M. Taurek, Should the Numbers Count?, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 293, 294 (1977) 
(defending the view that group size is irrelevant to which group should be saved). 
 175 Cf. Henry S. Richardson, Discerning Subordination and Inviolability: A Comment On 
Kamm’s Intricate Ethics, 20 UTILITAS 81, 89 (2008) (supporting the proposition that not all subor-
dination is unfair). 
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What sorts of patient-based justifications for age-based criteria are ob-
jectionable? The best examples involve bias and animus. Even if—
somehow—a policy grounded in animus against the old helped more older 
patients than it hurt (for instance, if an animus-motivated policy of denying 
fertility treatments to older women saved those women from spending money 
on futile care), the animus would remain objectionable. Rather than eliminat-
ing the policy, the solution would be to adopt the policy without the ani-
mus.176 So long as they are not grounded in animus, however, patient-based 
justifications for the use of age criteria are normatively acceptable even if age 
is used as a sole factor, without the capacity for an individualized rebuttal. 
B. Provider-Based Justifications 
As a threshold matter, classifications grounded in providers’ implicit 
biases, or in animus, are objectionable for the reasons offered above. Classi-
fications grounded in controversial accounts of the good life, meanwhile, 
present the same difficult questions discussed in Part II.A. For instance, a 
provider’s invocation of Callahan’s theory of the meaning of old age as a 
justification for not providing a treatment to an older patient would present 
serious moral problems.177 These problems parallel those raised when pro-
viders refuse to provide treatments on religious or cultural grounds.178 
Putting animus to one side, even though providers cannot impose un-
wanted treatment on patients, they enjoy some degree of “personal preroga-
tive,” as well as some degree of “professional prerogative,” to not provide 
requested treatments.179 Their professional prerogative may also extend to 
                                                                                                                           
 176 See Jeff McMahan, Intention, Permissibility, Terrorism, and War, 23 PHIL. PERSP. 345, 
354–56 (2009) (examining in detail whether a “wrongful intention can make an act impermissi-
ble”); cf. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Tenn. v. Rutherford Cty., 209 F. Supp. 2d 799, 808 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2002) (discussing policy that was invalidated because it was adopted on the basis of an 
improper religious purpose, and efforts to cure that purpose). 
 177 See supra notes 116–117 and accompanying text. 
 178 See generally Robin Fretwell Wilson, Essay, The Limits of Conscience: Moral Clashes 
Over Deeply Divisive Healthcare Procedures, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 41, 41–42 (2008) (detailing 
examples of providers’ refusals on religious or moral grounds to provide emergency contracep-
tives, birth control, or abortions). 
 179 Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914); see Litton, supra note 
20, at 341. For a discussion of personal prerogatives not to do what is in others’ interest, see G.A. 
COHEN, RESCUING JUSTICE AND EQUALITY 10 (2008) (“The prerogative grants each person the 
right to be something other than an engine for the welfare of other people.”); cf. Bruce A. Green, 
The Role of Personal Values in Professional Decisionmaking, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19, 25 
(1997) (arguing that “a lawyer generally may rely on” her own moral and religious commitments 
“in deciding whom not to represent”). 
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persuading patients to select some options over others.180 Providers are 
permitted to use age-based criteria to pursue a legitimate prerogative, such 
as not providing futile care: the use of age-based criteria does not render 
impermissible an otherwise permissible objective. 
Both patients’ interests and societal interests set ethical limits on pro-
vider-based justifications for the use of age-based criteria. When providers’ 
use of age-based criteria runs counter to the interest of patients or of society, 
providers’ prerogative to use such criteria can be overridden. Importantly, 
the interests of patients and of society also set limits on providers’ refusal to 
use age-based criteria: even if providers may prefer to engage in individual-
ized analyses instead of following evidence-based recommendations, 
whether for reasons of “defensive medicine” or because of a distaste for 
age-based criteria, patients’ medical interests quickly become normatively 
decisive. The same is arguably true when societal interests clash with pro-
viders’ interests.181 Furthermore, a prerogative’s strength may depend on its 
basis—the goal of seeking personal financial gain may support only a weak 
prerogative, whereas a provider’s understanding of her professional role 
may support a stronger one.182 
C. Societal Justifications 
Societal justifications implicate a richer set of normative issues than 
patient-based or provider-based justifications. In this Subpart, I propose an 
approach to evaluating societal justifications for age-based criteria that I 
call the lifetime justice approach and consider objections to that approach. 
1. The Lifetime Justice Approach 
The lifetime justice approach incorporates two principles that are 
widely agreed to be normatively attractive and that support the use of age-
based criteria: providing greater medical benefits and assisting those who 
will be worst off if not treated.183 It also contains a third principle, that of 
                                                                                                                           
 180 Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Linda L. Emanuel, Four Models of the Physician-Patient Relation-
ship, 267 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2221, 2223 (1992) (describing the rise of “patient sovereignty” in 
health care where the physician provides information regarding treatment options to enable the 
patient to make a choice). 
 181 See Hall, supra note 172, at 721–22 (providing examples of health care providers’ duties 
to the state, law, public health goals, and the public good). 
 182 See Mark R. Wicclair, Conscientious Objection in Medicine, 14 BIOETHICS 205, 221–25 
(2000). 
 183 See Derek Parfit, Equality and Priority, 10 RATIO 202, 213 (1997); cf. Sharp & Millum, 
supra note 174, at 112–14 (proposing that more weight should be given to benefitting the worst 
off). 
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not abandoning patients. In some cases, these principles align; in others, 
they pull against one another. Although the lifetime justice approach pro-
vides no precise algorithm for balancing these principles, its open texture is 
a virtue, not a vice.184 
a. Providing Greater Benefits 
The importance of providing greater medical benefits largely speaks 
for itself. Although some have argued that providers should entirely ignore 
patients’ prospect of long-term survival when deciding whom to treat or 
what to do, the goal of helping patients live longer and healthier lives is 
widely agreed to be an important one for medicine.185 Even many critics of 
age-based criteria are willing to permit their use as a proxy for a patient’s 
prospect of benefit, when used in an empirically accurate way alongside 
other proxies.186 Especially when decisions are being made at institutional 
or societal levels, indifference to the fact that some patients have better pro-
spects of benefit leads to unpalatable results. For instance, an insensitive 
approach to the prospect of benefit would entail the absurdity that a hospital 
should be indifferent between including a drug in its formulary that will 
produce ten years of life for some patients and including a different drug 
that will produce six months of life for other patients. A more plausible 
view—the one the lifetime justice approach adopts—is that achieving better 
outcomes for patients is an important goal of medicine, although not the 
only goal. 
                                                                                                                           
 184 Cf. Govind Persad, Alan Wertheimer & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Standing by Our Principles: 
Meaningful Guidance, Moral Foundations, and Multi-Principle Methodology in Medical Scarcity, 
10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 46, 46 (2010). Contra Samuel J. Kerstein & Greg Bognar, Complete Lives in 
the Balance, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 37, 41–43 (2010) (stating that the system put forth by Persad, 
Wertheimer, and Emanuel “fails to help us in reaching an allocation decision in a variety of in-
stances”). 
 185 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 11, at 373; cf. Persad, supra note 21, at 138–39 (discussing 
“length-insensitive” approaches). This argument was endorsed by the majority of the Israeli com-
mittee on transplantation. See Katvan et al., supra note 155, at 9. 
 186 See, e.g., Kilner, supra note 168, at 416 (stating that consideration of age is acceptable as 
part of “the medical assessment required by a medical-benefit criterion”); Silver, supra note 42, at 
1070 (similar); see also Katvan et al., supra note 155, at 10 (describing the minority position on 
the Israeli committee, which would have permitted the use of age in part on the basis of the “sig-
nificance of the number of years the donated organ, as a public resource, will serve its recipient”); 
cf. Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers, Bringing Age Discrimination and Disability Discrim-
ination Together: Too Few Intersections, Too Many Interstices, 11 MARQ. ELDER’S ADVISOR 
139, 146 (2009) (raising concerns that age-based criteria will underestimate older people’s pro-
spect of benefit, but not denying that age can in principle be a proxy for prospect of benefit). 
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b. Assisting the Least Advantaged 
The idea that assisting the least advantaged patients should have moral 
priority is attractive, but it is frequently understood to support giving priori-
ty to the patients who are currently sickest.187 In contrast, the lifetime jus-
tice approach understands disadvantage as a matter of lifetime deprivation. 
Consider a case parallel to that of Charlotte, from the Introduction: a hospi-
tal must choose to provide a scarce organ to a twenty-five-year-old patient 
whose kidneys are projected to fail in a few months, or to a seventy-five-
year-old patient currently in acute kidney failure. The older patient is sicker 
right now, but is more advantaged from a lifetime perspective: facing death 
at twenty-five is a far worse outcome than facing death at seventy-five, after 
one has enjoyed many years of life.188 Although the lifetime justice ap-
proach agrees that medicine should also give some priority to those who are 
currently very sick, it grounds priority to the sick in a principle of nonaban-
donment, discussed in the next Subpart, rather than in the principle of prior-
ity to the least advantaged.189 
The lifetime justice approach bases the case for giving priority to 
younger people on the principle of giving priority to the least advantaged, 
rather than on any claim about older people’s subjective well-being. As 
such, it does not rely on the claim that an individual’s seventh decade of life 
will be less good for her than her second decade was; rather, it asserts that 
an individual’s entitlement to receive scarce or expensive resources needed 
to live through her seventh decade is less than her entitlement to receive those 
resources needed to live through her second decade.190 The lifetime justice 
approach therefore need not take a position on the question of whether years 
lived later in life have diminishing marginal utility to the person living them, 
have greater marginal utility, or neither.191 
Because younger age is typically a proxy for better prognosis, the use 
of age-based criteria usually both achieves better outcomes and assists the 
least advantaged. Assisting the least advantaged, however, can come apart 
                                                                                                                           
 187 See Persad et al., supra note 154, at 424–25 (describing “sickest-first” allocation). 
 188 See RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION 85 (1994); Persad et al., supra note 154, at 425. 
That tort law authorizes compensation for shortened life expectancy reflects the value of living to 
an older age. See, e.g., Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 280 (Ind. 2000) (collecting cases). 
 189 See infra notes 202–209 and accompanying text. 
 190 To use some terminology from ethical theory, the lifetime justice view makes deontic 
claims (i.e. claims about what a person is entitled to receive) rather than axiological claims (i.e. 
claims about what is good for a person). See Persad, supra note 21, at 131. Cf. JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 28 (rev. ed. 1999) (discussing the “priority of the right over the good”). 
 191 See Maria Knoph Kvamme et al., Increasing Marginal Utility of Small Increases in Life-
Expectancy? Results from a Population Survey, 29 J. HEALTH ECON. 541, 547 (2010) (reporting 
the results of a study that attempts to measure the marginal utility of added life expectancy). 
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from providing greater benefits, as in cases where an older patient, despite 
her age-limited life expectancy, is nevertheless likely to gain more from 
treatment than a younger person can. In such cases, unlike John Rawls’ fa-
mous “difference principle,” which requires that we maximize the position of 
the least advantaged before considering what course of action provides great-
est overall benefits, the lifetime justice approach engages in a rougher balanc-
ing of assisting the least advantaged and achieving better outcomes.192 
The lifetime justice approach differs from an approach that Daniel Cal-
lahan has defended, which employs a “cut-off” age above which people lose 
entitlement to life-extending treatment.193 Callahan’s approach is “sufficien-
tarian”: it assumes that there is a specific threshold of advantage above (and 
below) which fine-grained differences are irrelevant.194 Sufficientarianism 
faces the criticism that it ignores morally significant differences above and 
below the threshold.195 Rather than setting a threshold at seventy-five, it is 
preferable to recognize that it is more disadvantageous to live to only seven-
ty-five than to live to eighty-five, or to live only to fifty-five than to live to 
sixty-five.196 Recognizing the importance of these differences better fits 
with the fact that even a single additional year of life is enormously valua-
ble. The use of cutoffs and thresholds, however, can sometimes be justifia-
ble on administrability grounds: setting a threshold for cancer screening at 
age seventy-five is easier for providers to implement and patients to under-
                                                                                                                           
 192 Compare RAWLS, supra note 190, at 277–85 (sympathetically considering, but ultimately 
rejecting, an approach that intuitively balances improvements in the general good against the in-
terests of the least advantaged), with Persad et al., supra note 154, at 429 (defending a balancing 
approach), and Parfit, supra note 183, at 213 (arguing that “benefits to the worse off could be 
morally outweighed by sufficiently great benefits to the better off [and] [i]f we ask what would be 
sufficient, there may not always be a precise answer”). 
 193 See CALLAHAN, supra note 26, at 116 (arguing for the imposition of an age limit to re-
ceive life-extending treatment despite the presence of sufficient resources). 
 194 See id.; Paula Casal, Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough, 117 ETHICS 296, 299–300 (2007). 
 195 Casal, supra note 194, at 313–18 (critiquing the sufficientarian view); see also Kolber, 
supra note 131, at 684–85 (arguing that “sharp discontinuities” in policy fail to treat similarly 
situated individuals similarly). 
 196 What about living to fifteen versus living to five? Cases involving children generate addi-
tional complexities. I have argued that even though providing greater benefits and giving priority 
to the least advantaged favor young children, the fact that older children are more invested in their 
future plans counterbalances the age-based priority that younger children should receive. Persad et 
al., supra note 154, at 425 (claiming that the a twenty-year old’s death is “intuitively worse” than 
the death of a two-month old); cf. DWORKIN, supra note 188, at 88 (suggesting that the death of an 
adolescent is worse than an infant because the adolescent “made a significant personal investment 
in his own life”). But I believe that reasonable people can disagree on this point. See Govind Per-
sad, Public Preferences About Fairness and the Ethics of Allocating Scarce Medical Interventions, 
in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON FAIRNESS, EQUITY, AND JUSTICE 51, 56 (Meng Li & 
David Tracer eds. 2017) (discussing the reasonableness of differing allocation systems). 
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stand than a more complex algorithm would be.197 An administrability justi-
fication for an age cutoff, however, is much less normatively concerning 
than Callahan’s grounding of an age cutoff in a tendentious view about the 
moral meaning of old age.198 
The lifetime justice approach also differs from Norman Daniels’ pruden-
tial lifetime account, which defends age-based criteria on the basis that they 
are in the anticipated interest of each individual in society because everyone 
expects to live through many stages of life.199 Because Daniels grounds his 
approach in the idea of individual prudence rather than in principles of dis-
tributive justice, his view is more willing to allow the interests of particular 
individuals to override the provision of greater benefits to society, but his ap-
proach may also be more willing to allow individuals to risk dying young in 
exchange for the chance to live to an older age.200 Additionally, the lifetime 
justice approach, by incorporating a nonabandonment principle, can justify 
helping older people even when a policy of abandoning them might be in 
their self-interest ex ante. In contrast, Daniels’ view finds it difficult to ex-
plain why it would not be prudent to agree to be abandoned in old age in ex-
change for a greater chance of living to old age.201 In many cases, however, 
the lifetime justice approach will reach the same verdict as Daniels’ approach. 
c. Nonabandonment 
Even if someone has already enjoyed a great deal of life and/or has 
poor prospects of gaining more life from treatment, her claims to assistance 
still possess moral force. This reflects the importance of nonabandonment 
and social inclusion—although I conceive of nonabandonment as part of 
                                                                                                                           
 197 See Schuck, supra note 15, at 34 (“[A]ge classifications can be administered more easily 
than those dependent upon criteria that are difficult to measure directly or that require individual-
ized determinations.”); see also Kolber, supra note 131, at 687 (observing that thresholds allow 
for lower costs and ease of administration). 
 198 See supra notes 116–117 and accompanying text. 
 199 See generally Daniels, supra note 129 (arguing that the inevitability of aging, in part, mer-
its different treatment of different age groups). 
 200 See id. at 475 n.2; cf. RAWLS, supra note 190, at 24–25 (arguing that goodness and right-
ness are distinct). 
 201 See Kilner, supra note 168, at 411 (arguing that Daniels’s prudential lifespan view would 
“impose constraints on liberty and welfare during the elderly stage of life that would probably be 
experienced as unbearably harsh even if they were in fact objectively prudent”); cf. F.M. KAMM, 
MORALITY, MORTALITY: VOLUME II: RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND STATUS 303 (1996) (arguing that we 
sometimes cannot enforce agreements to be harmed against people, even when those agreements 
were ex ante reasonable to accept). But see Michael Otsuka, Kamm on the Morality of Killing, 108 
ETHICS 197, 203, 206–07 (1997) (arguing that such agreements should be enforced). I discuss this 
issue and its relevance to law in Govind C. Persad, Note, Risk, Everyday Intuitions, and the Insti-
tutional Value of Tort Law, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1445, 1468–69 (2010). 
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what justice requires, others see it as a value different from, or orthogonal 
to, justice.202 The nonabandonment principle implies that older people 
should not be entirely excluded from the benefits of the health care system, 
and that they retain claims to assistance insofar as they can benefit from 
medical interventions. 
Within the broader lifetime justice approach, claims grounded in 
nonabandonment must be balanced against the goals of providing greater 
benefits and giving priority to the least advantaged. Determining how far 
nonabandonment should constrain the pursuit of the latter two principles is 
challenging.203 There are compelling arguments grounded in fairness for 
regarding individuals’ claims to assistance in avoiding early death as cate-
gorically more important than their claims to assistance later in life.204 In 
contrast, nonabandonment claims remain compelling where an older person 
is threatened by severe pain. Even though the older person has already en-
joyed many years of life, the moral urgency of severe pain could swamp 
differences in future prospects or past benefit that would otherwise justify 
favoring younger people.205 
Another relevant example where nonabandonment claims are compel-
ling involves prevention and psychological support services for serious 
mental deterioration, such as dementia. Severe dementia can undermine the 
narrative coherence of a person’s life, and can make basic participation in 
                                                                                                                           
 202 Compare Anderson, supra note 137, at 295–96 (arguing that choice-based accounts are too 
willing to abandon people who make unwise choices), and Axel Gosseries, What Makes Age Dis-
crimination Special? A Philosophical Look at the ECJ Case Law, 43 NETH. J. LEGAL PHIL. 59, 
67–68 (2014) (discussing a “continuist approach to what justice requires” which requires the pro-
vision of basic needs regardless of age), with SEGALL, supra note 136, at 58–73 (grounding the 
wrongness of abandonment in solidarity rather than moral equality), and G.A. COHEN, WHY NOT 
SOCIALISM? 37–38 (2009) (contrasting claims grounded in justice with claims grounded in the 
“ideal of community”). 
 203 See Juliana Bidadanure, In Defense of the PLA, 13 AM. J. BIOETHICS 25, 26 (2013). 
 204 Cf. RAWLS, supra note 190, at 155 (criticizing an approach that asks the “less fortunate . . . 
to accept the greater advantages of others as a sufficient reason for lower expectations over the 
whole course of . . . life” for being “an extreme demand”). 
 205 See Gosseries, supra note 202, at 67–68 (concluding that the case for age-based criteria is 
weaker when older people’s “ability to cover their basic needs” is in jeopardy); Kerstein & Bog-
nar, supra note 184, at 38 (arguing that “the alleviation of severe, debilitating pain has special 
moral urgency”); cf. Amy Gutmann, For and Against Equal Access to Health Care, 59 MILBANK 
Q. 542, 547 (1981) (proposing a “precept of egalitarian justice that physical pains of a sufficient 
degree be treated similarly, regardless of who experiences them”); Robert M. Veatch, Justice and 
the Economics of Terminal Illness, 18 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 34, 38 (1988) (“For the terminally ill 
cancer patient in excruciating agony who could be treated cheaply with morphine, or the terminal-
ly ill person in need of clean sheets and compassionate nursing support, the fact that he or she has 
experienced a long, happy life seems irrelevant.”). 
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community life impossible.206 An older person who has enjoyed a long life 
could therefore offer credible justifications for dementia prevention and 
supportive care, even though that care consumes resources also needed by 
younger people whose prospects of living a long life are still uncertain.  
In contrast, although a nonabandonment principle can support claims 
to pain relief and psychological support in the dying process, it does not 
support claims to additional years of life. Death certainly renders participa-
tion in community life impossible; however, death is not painful in itself, 
and does not undermine the narrative of a person’s life, but simply ends that 
narrative. Thus, for instance, the nonabandonment principle would entitle a 
seventy-five-year-old cancer patient to palliative care and psychological 
counseling, even when such care would consume medical resources that 
could have been used to benefit younger patients, but would not entitle that 
patient to an equal opportunity to receive expensive chemotherapy. To the 
extent that chemotherapy could extend her life, the principle of providing 
greater medical benefits would support her case, but the principle of priority 
to the least advantaged would count strongly against it. Of course, many 
interventions have both pain-relieving and life-extending elements, which 
makes the task of balancing nonabandonment against other values more 
complex. It should be easy, however, to reject nonabandonment claims to 
treatments that simply improve nonessential aspects of function.207 
Two final points on nonabandonment are important. First, I understand 
nonabandonment as one value that must be balanced against others, rather 
than as a deontological constraint that stands prior to, and potentially fore-
closes the consideration of, other values. This is because, inter alia, the aban-
donment of a patient is a failure to aid rather than an active deprivation; an 
abandoned older person is not used as a means to others’ good, even though 
she is left below a threshold of basic decency.208 Second, the nonabandon-
ment principle is grounded in individuals’ rights, which do not always track 
their subjective preferences. Even if an individual would be willing to sacri-
                                                                                                                           
 206 See DWORKIN, supra note 188, at 231. On the capacity to participate, see Ezekiel J. Eman-
uel, Where Civic Republicanism and Deliberative Democracy Meet, 26 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 12, 
13 (1996) (arguing that health services that “ensure full and active participation by citizens in 
public deliberations —are to be socially guaranteed as basic”); see also Edmund G. Howe & 
Christopher J. Lettieri, Health Care Rationing in the Aged: Ethical and Clinical Perspectives, 15 
DRUGS & AGING 37, 42 (1999) (describing loss of the “capacity to enjoy meaningful interactions” 
as a loss “worse than many or all others”). 
 207 See Gutmann, supra note 205, at 546 (using dentistry as an example of equal access to 
functionally equivalent treatments that are “aesthetically or socially” different). 
 208 Cf. Richardson, supra note 175, at 89 (discussing cases where a person’s “being harmed is 
a causal means to the greater good”). This implies that, for instance, patients may be abandoned 
on the basis of age in tragic situations where some patients must unavoidably be left below a 
threshold of basic decency. Id. 
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fice her claim to dementia support in exchange for a greater chance at life-
extending care, society’s responsibility is to prevent social exclusion, not to 
provide the medical outcomes that a patient might prefer.209 
2. Objections 
a. Moral Equality 
The most common criticism of age-sensitive approaches, like the life-
time justice approach, contends that respecting older people’s fundamental 
moral equality requires providing health care without regard to age.210 The 
lifetime justice approach has an easier time addressing these concerns than 
other defenses of age-based criteria do because it rejects animus and bias, 
eschews reliance on tendentious accounts of the meaning of old age, and in-
corporates a nonabandonment principle that addresses the concern that older 
people’s interests will be categorically ignored. Once these issues have been 
put to one side, there is a compelling case in support of considering the fact 
that older people have enjoyed more life and have less life to gain.211 Alt-
hough criteria other than age may also be important, these factors establish 
a case in support of age-based criteria. Such criteria parallel similar policies 
that impose comparative disadvantages on wealthy, socially advantaged, or 
well-educated people on the basis that these people have already enjoyed 
more of a good and can gain less from further assistance. Consider, for in-
stance, policies that give special financial assistance, or admissions priority, 
to students pursuing their first undergraduate degree.212 These policies are 
normatively justifiable on the basis that those who already have an under-
graduate degree have already enjoyed more education and can gain less 
from further education. Contrary to the reasoning that undergirds the moral 
                                                                                                                           
 209 See Gutmann, supra note 205, at 551; cf. Leo Katz, Harm and Justification in Negligence, 
4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 397, 405–08 (2003) (arguing that medical care ought to be distrib-
uted according to patients’ objective claims rather than according to its effect on their subjective 
well-being). 
 210 See, e.g., Eidelson, supra note 42, at 1646 (arguing that antidiscrimination claims that 
reject age-based criteria are a way of “insisting on the public recognition of people’s equal worth 
and dignity”); Katvan, supra note 155, at 9 (claiming that age-based criteria involve “a decision 
that some people are ‘worth more’ and some are ‘worth less’”); Kilner, supra note 168, at 414 (“A 
person’s life arguably should be preserved simply because it is a human life. In this perspective, 
the age attached to that life would be irrelevant. Otherwise, one’s right to life would diminish with 
every day that one lives.”). 
 211 Cf. A.B. Shaw, In Defence of Ageism, 20 J. MED. ETHICS 188, 191 (1994) (“Older people 
have enjoyed more life and have less life left to enjoy.”). 
 212 See, e.g., Hunter v. Univ. of Wash., 2 P.3d 1022, 1024 (Wash. App. 2000). Another paral-
lel is assistance for first-generation college students—a group that, like age groups, is defined by 
an unchosen characteristic. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 13504(b)(1) (2012). 
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equality objection, such policies do not disrespect the moral worth of the 
college-educated or create a situation where one’s right to education dimin-
ishes with each class one attends.213 Rather, giving priority to those pursu-
ing a first undergraduate degree recognizes that what it takes to respect 
someone’s moral equality depends on their circumstances, and that differen-
tial receipt of benefits does not imply differential moral worth. Provisions 
that favor undergraduates pursuing their first degree do not suggest that the 
right to education itself diminishes as one becomes more educated, but ra-
ther that claims to assistance in fulfilling that right depend on one’s circum-
stances and prior advantages.214 The same is true for older people and the 
right to life-extending medical care. 
Similarly, the assertion that the “distinction—between a person’s worth 
and the worth of saving her life—is very thin indeed” and that by “consign-
ing the aged to a lower-priority class for access to lifesaving treatment, we 
risk conveying and fostering the attitude that they are simply of lesser value 
as persons” goes wrong by ignoring the differential capacity of medical care 
to help different people.215 The act of saving someone’s life is simultaneous-
ly the act of extending that life, and ignoring the difference between extend-
ing one life by five years and extending another by twenty-five years, or 
providing one person the chance to live through their second decade rather 
than providing another the chance to live through their seventh, is morally 
indefensible given the value of each year of life.216 Consider the following 
pair of examples: 
1.  Including Drug A in a formulary will only enable doctors to delay one 
patient’s death by a year, whereas including Drug B will enable them 
both to delay a different patient’s death by a year and to delay a third 
patient’s death by twenty years. In this example, we should include 
Drug B rather than Drug A; doing so does not regard the first patient as 
having lesser value, but instead appropriately recognizes the great im-
portance of extending the third patient’s life by twenty years. 
2.  Including Drug A in a formulary will enable doctors to delay one death 
for a year, whereas including Drug B will enable them to delay another 
patient’s death by twenty-one years. The case for including Drug B re-
mains clear; even though the benefits of Drug B now go to only one pa-
                                                                                                                           
 213 Cf. Kilner, supra note 168, at 414 (providing an argument for the moral equality objection 
that all human life has intrinsic worth). 
 214 Contra id. 
 215 Eidelson, supra note 42, at 1647. 
 216 See Richard Yetter Chappell, Against ‘Saving Lives’: Equal Concern and Differential 
Impact, 30 BIOETHICS 159, 159 (2016). 
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tient, choosing Drug B still does not regard the first patient as having 
lesser value than the second, but instead appropriately recognizes the 
great importance of extending the second patient’s life by twenty-one 
years. 
Even though both Drug A and Drug B “save a life,” Drug B can do far more 
good than Drug A can. The moral equality objection goes wrong when it 
overlooks the moral importance of doing more good rather than less, partic-
ularly where a valuable good like years of life is at stake. 
Understanding that the provision of differential benefits is consistent 
with equal moral worth also undermines a moral equality objection that 
Leslie Francis and Anita Silvers offer.217 Francis and Silvers believe that 
defenders of age-based criteria wrongly “transmute equality into a quantum 
of something, often welfare or the like,” and “adopt a distributive rather 
than a procedural understanding of equality.”218 I agree with Francis and 
Silvers that equal respect should be understood as procedural rather than 
distributive. Their argument, however, more properly applies to critics of 
age-based criteria. Such critics frequently contend that recognizing older 
people as morally equal requires a distributive undertaking—namely, 
providing them the same quantum of medical resources that younger people 
receive.219 In contrast, the lifetime justice approach concludes that recogniz-
ing the moral equality of older people is a matter of procedural fairness (ex-
emplified by, for instance, avoidance of animus and bias), and that once 
procedural fairness is achieved, it is acceptable to provide older people a 
lesser quantum of resources. It is critics, not defenders, of age-based criteria 
who mistakenly understand equal respect as requiring the provision of 
equally sized benefits. 
Moral equality arguments can also take an empirical form, charging 
that age-based criteria will spur demeaning attitudes against older people or 
undermine social cohesion.220 Such claims cannot be resolved by pure nor-
mative or legal reasoning, but only by evidence about the empirical effects 
                                                                                                                           
 217 Francis & Silvers, supra note 186, at 144. 
 218 Id. 
 219 See, e.g., Eidelson, supra note 42, at 1646; Katvan, supra note 155, at 9; Kilner, supra 
note 168, at 414 (noting a critique of using age as a criterion, namely that age is irrelevant because 
all human life has value and “[o]therwise, one’s right to life would diminish with every day that 
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 220 See, e.g., Eidelson, supra note 42, at 1649 (asserting that “[s]tate-sanctioned medical ra-
tioning that expressly disfavors older people is troubling because of the real risk that it will be 
understood to reflect judgments of comparative worth, and that it will thereby lend renewed credi-
bility to . . . demeaning attitudes toward older people”); Kilner, supra note 168, at 414–15 (“An 
age criterion may be disrespectful of the elderly as persons . . . . In the process of showing dis- 
respect to an entire group of people, society itself can become brutalized.”). 
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of these policies and of alternative arrangements. Furthermore, even if the 
use of age-based criteria proves to have some negative effects on older peo-
ple or on social cohesion, this would still have to be balanced against the 
advantages of using age-based criteria. I will nonetheless yield to tempta-
tion and offer one brief speculation: age-based criteria could potentially 
strengthen, rather than weaken, social cohesion between the young and the 
old by demonstrating to the young that the old recognize the advantages 
they have experienced and are willing to sacrifice further gains so that oth-
ers can enjoy similar advantages. In the same way, for example, progressive 
taxation or preferences for first-generation college students might strength-
en cohesion between the advantaged and disadvantaged rather than under-
mining cohesion. This hypothesis—like the contrary hypotheses proposed 
by critics of age-based criteria—warrants empirical research. 
A fascinating cousin to the moral equality argument is advanced by 
Derek Parfit, who argues that a person’s status as the same person over time is 
a continuous variable (like age) rather than an all-or-nothing fact.221 What 
Parfit calls the “Reductionist View” of personal identity counsels against giv-
ing moral weight to a person’s past advantages, because these advantages, 
seen from their present vantage point, are no longer fully their own.222 The 
Reductionist View would undermine efforts to justify age-based criteria on 
the basis of priority to the least advantaged, because from an older person’s 
current perspective, the earlier years of life “she” enjoyed are not so vividly 
her own as her last few years of life—those early years are similar to years 
of life someone else might have enjoyed in the past.223 Adopting the Reduc-
tionist View, however, would make such simple questions as who some-
one’s friends or family are, or what property they own, extremely difficult 
to answer.224 Furthermore, although the Reductionist View undermines the 
principle of priority to the least advantaged, it also does not lend support to 
a principle of nonabandonment or provision of equal benefits. Rather, Parfit 
argues that we should “aim for the least possible suffering, whatever its dis-
tribution.”225 Ultimately, adopting the Reductionist View would support 
only the principle of providing greater benefits, and would require abandon-
ing both nonabandonment and priority to the least advantaged. 
                                                                                                                           
 221 DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 275–82 (1984). 
 222 See id. 
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b. Alternative Currencies of Distributive Justice 
Some argue that years of life are the wrong “currency” of advantage to 
focus on when distributing the benefits of health care.226 Instead, they con-
tend that it is more coherent to focus on fairly distributing individuals’ oppor-
tunity to enjoy a given number of years of life.227 This line of argument often 
goes on to conclude that a focus on fairly distributing opportunities is never-
theless normatively mistaken because it would require tallying up the total 
cost of the medical care each person has received.228 Less often, this argu-
ment is used to recommend shifting to a strategy of equalizing opportunity.229 
In contrast, Daniel Sharp and Joseph Millum argue that rather than giv-
ing priority to those who have enjoyed the fewest life-years, we should widen 
our lens and give priority to those who have enjoyed the least lifetime ad-
vantage more generally.230 In many cases, such as the moral requirement to 
give priority to ill children, the lifetime justice approach and Sharp and Mil-
lum’s view reach the same verdict.231 The lifetime justice approach, however, 
gives priority to those at risk of dying prematurely, and Sharp and Millum’s 
view gives priority to those at risk of enjoying less overall advantage. 
I argue that years of life are a more important criterion for the distribu-
tion of health care than either opportunity to enjoy life or lifetime ad-
vantage, for both pragmatic and fundamentally normative reasons. Pragmat-
                                                                                                                           
 226 I borrow the “currency” terminology from G.A. Cohen, On The Currency of Egalitarian 
Justice, 99 ETHICS 906, 906 (1989). 
 227 See, e.g., Kilner, supra note 168, at 409 (arguing that if a young person has received more 
medical care than an elderly person, “[i]t may not be accurate to say that the younger person 
should be saved because she or he has not been given as great an opportunity to live as the older 
person,” but rather the elderly person should be saved). 
 228 See Francis & Silvers, supra note 186, at 144 (providing that “[a]n analogy would be to 
lifetime caps on health insurance payments, with the elderly having consumed their share over 
their lifespan”); cf. Council on Ethics and Judicial Affairs, supra note 139, at 33 (rejecting the 
view that patients’ past access to and use of scarce medical resources gives them lower priority 
than others). 
 229 See Kilner, supra note 168, at 411–12; see also Gusmano, supra note 168, at 184–85 
(questioning whether the elderly have used their “fair share of public resources” and asking “[i]s it 
fair to limit curative care that may be beneficial to an 80-year-old patient if she received relatively 
little care earlier in life . . . ?”). 
 230 Sharp & Millum, supra note 174, at 124 (claiming that the worst off are people “who have 
the least lifetime advantage, where advantage is understood in terms of a plurality of valuable 
dimensions”). This approach is criticized in Kerstein & Bognar, supra note 184, at 38 (arguing 
that being denied treatment for pain due to being “too well off overall to have an urgent medical 
need” would be “invidious”), and in Evans, supra note 11, at 825 (suggesting that the “early turn-
ing off of the rich and fortunate in favour of the poor and deprived” is an “an intellectually charm-
ing reductio ad absurdum”). 
 231 See Sharp & Millum, supra note 174, at 124 (“Virtually no one who makes it to age 50 
will be as badly off over her lifetime as someone who dies at age five. Non-health factors are 
unlikely to make a difference to this result.”). 
2019] The Legality of Age-Based Criteria in Health Care 937 
ically, as Sharp and Millum concede, measuring age is easier than measur-
ing lifetime advantage.232 More fundamentally, focusing on life-years has 
three advantages. First, assessments of either opportunity to enjoy life or of 
overall advantage will likely be objectionably intrusive, whereas age as-
sessments will not.233 Second, years of life have many of the qualities asso-
ciated with other widely accepted currencies of distributive justice, such as 
the “primary goods” Rawls discusses: additional years of life, like wealth, 
health, or opportunity, “normally have a use whatever a person’s rational 
plan of life.”234 Third, health care providers are ill-placed to assess patients’ 
overall advantage, but well-placed to assess age.235 
c. Disparate Impact on Protected Classes 
Some critics charge that age-based criteria indirectly disadvantage 
women, who make up a greater share of the oldest age groups.236 This con-
sequence of age-based criteria is, on its face, normatively objectionable. It 
could also render age-based criteria legally vulnerable, although recent 
changes in law have weakened disadvantaged groups’ protection against 
disparate impact.237 
In an unequal society where advantage and disadvantage (including 
life expectancy) correlate with socially defined categories, the problem of 
indirect disadvantage is pervasive. The use of age-based criteria will indi-
rectly disadvantage women, who are already disadvantaged in many ways 
by social arrangements.238 This disadvantage, however, occurs in the con-
text of life expectancy, where women are advantaged rather than disadvan-
taged.239 This, at the very least, makes the use of age-based criteria less ob-
                                                                                                                           
 232 Id. at 117. 
 233 See Schuck, supra note 15, at 33–35. 
 234 RAWLS, supra note 190, at 54. 
 235 See Clarke et al., supra note 139, at 33 (noting that medicine is ill-placed to assess pa-
tients’ access to factors that impact health including “income, education, and access to primary 
care”). 
 236 See Howe & Lettieri, supra note 206, at 41 (discussing the argument that “discrimination 
against the elderly disproportionately discriminates against women” because women have longer 
lifespans than men); Kapp, supra note 103, at 328 (contending that age-based criteria have an 
“inherently sexist impact” on women). 
 237 See Areheart, supra note 122, at 993–95; cf. Nungesser v. Columbia Univ., 169 F. Supp. 
3d 353, 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that “courts have held that a private right of action based on 
the alleged disparate impact of a policy on a protected group is not cognizable under Title IX”). 
 238 See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984). 
 239 SEGALL, supra note 136, at 106–07. 
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jectionable than a policy that further disadvantages women in contexts 
where they are already disadvantaged.240 
Attention to intersectional identity further weakens the basis for con-
cern about indirect disadvantage. Many younger women will experience no 
disadvantage from the use of age-based criteria and will even experience 
advantages from the use of such criteria: any disadvantage will fall on older 
women who have already enjoyed more years of life. Additionally, because 
of correlations between wealth, race, and life expectancy, those older wom-
en are more likely to be well-off and less likely to be African-American.241 
If imposing indirect disadvantage on women as a group remains a concern, 
one strategy would be to direct some of the resources saved via the use of 
age-based criteria to programs that aim to assist women at younger ages—
for instance, using the resources saved by adopting an age cutoff for trans-
plantation to fund health literacy efforts that target younger women. 
A related, but less compelling argument charges that using older age as a 
proxy for future life expectancy logically entails the use of race as a proxy. 
Because life expectancy is lower on average for African-Americans, this 
would entail the direct disadvantaging of African-Americans.242 This concern 
can be addressed with relative ease. Because living to old age is an advanta-
geous outcome, using old age as a proxy for low future life expectancy disad-
vantages members of a generally advantaged group (people who have already 
lived to old age). In contrast, using race as a proxy for future life expectancy 
would impose additional disadvantage on an already disadvantaged group. 
IV. EVALUATING AGE-BASED CRITERIA IN PRACTICE 
In this Part, I apply the analysis offered in the preceding Parts to age-
based criteria that are in use, or have been proposed, in medical practice and 
health policy. These areas include transplantation, reproductive medicine, 
disease screening, medical research, and the provision of health insurance. 
A. Transplantation 
The details of age-based criteria for access to transplantation depend 
both on the organ being transplanted and on the local norms of specific 
                                                                                                                           
 240 See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford & Carla Spivack, Tampon Taxes, Discrimination, and Hu-
man Rights, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 491, 493 (discussing a “tampon tax,” which increases a financial 
burden that already falls disproportionately on women). 
 241 See generally S. Jay Olshansky et al., Differences in Life Expectancy Due to Race and 
Educational Differences Are Widening, and Many May Not Catch Up, 8 HEALTH AFF. 1803 
(2012) (reporting correlations between race, education, and life expectancy). 
 242 See Morreim, supra note 42, at 341. 
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transplantation centers. Age-based criteria are frequently used in the alloca-
tion of lung transplants, kidney transplants, liver transplants, and heart 
transplants.243 Some medical and bioethical commentators nonetheless wor-
ry that the use of age-based criteria in transplantation is unfair age discrimi-
nation.244 These concerns may have motivated prohibitions in other coun-
tries on the use of age-based criteria in transplantation.245 For example, Is-
rael has prohibited any consideration of age in organ allocation, including 
approaches where age is only one factor among many.246 
The lifetime justice approach is not a detailed proposal for allocating 
organs.247 It does, however, provide guidance for the development of organ 
allocation policy. Most importantly, it counsels that the adoption of a policy 
like Israel’s, which categorically prohibits the use of age in allocation, 
would be a tragic and unfair waste of valuable medical resources. Age-
based criteria can help providers direct organs toward patients who have a 
greater prospect of benefiting from the organs, and can address the tragedy 
of early death. Patients, providers, hospitals, regulators, and judges should 
                                                                                                                           
 243 Katvan et al., supra note 155, at 8–9 (discussing the historical use of age limits for heart 
transplantation in Israel); Francesco Tona & Carlo Dal Lin, Clinical Indications for Heart Trans-
plantation, in THE PATHOLOGY OF CARDIAC TRANSPLANTATION 33, 35–36 (Ornella Leone et al. 
eds. 2016) (stating that wait list consideration for heart transplants is usually capped at 75 years); 
Suzanne R. Sharpton et al., Combined Effects of Recipient Age and Model for End-Stage Liver 
Disease Score on Liver Transplantation Outcomes, 98 TRANSPLANTATION 557, 557, 560 (2014) 
(observing that some age cut-offs for liver transplantation have been set around 65 or 70 years but 
arguing that age should not be used as a sole criterion for transplantation); Paul L. Tso, Access to 
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tries); Eric S. Weiss, Christian A. Merlo & Ashish S. Shah, Impact of Advanced Age in Lung 
Transplantation: An Analysis of United Network for Organ Sharing Data, 208 J. AM. C. SUR-
GEONS 400, 400 (2009) (describing the use of age-based criteria in medical practice and conclud-
ing that lung transplantation should not be used in patients age seventy years or older). 
 244 See, e.g., K. Ladin & D.W. Hanto, Rational Rationing or Discrimination: Balancing Equi-
ty and Efficiency Considerations in Kidney Allocation, 11 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 2317, 2318 
(2011) (observing that experts in the field contend that using age-based criteria to allocate organs 
“amounts to age discrimination, disadvantaging patients who could benefit significantly from 
transplantation because of a morally, and often, clinically irrelevant factor such as age”). 
 245 See, e.g., Liviu Segall et al., Criteria for and Appropriateness of Renal Transplantation in 
Elderly Patients with End-Stage Renal Disease: A Literature Review and Position Statement on 
Behalf of the European Renal Association–European Dialysis and Transplant Association Des-
cartes Working Group and European Renal Best Practice, 100 TRANSPLANTATION e55, e58–e59 
(2016). 
 246 Katvan et al., supra note 155, at 9–10 (discussing Israel’s rejection of age-based criteria). 
 247 The detailed kidney allocation proposal offered by Ross et al., supra note 5, at 2115–16, 
would be a good starting point for future work because it recognizes both the importance of 
providing greater medical benefits and of giving priority to people who have enjoyed less life. 
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all resist the seductive appeal of simplistic anticlassification arguments that 
describe age as an arbitrary basis for allocating organs.248 Relevantly for 
law, this implies that age-based criteria should not be subject to heightened 
scrutiny, and that judges should be deferential to evidence-based arguments 
for the relevance of age to outcomes. A normatively appealing approach to 
transplantation would use age as one eligibility criterion, alongside other 
criteria that might predict how likely the transplant is to provide the patient 
with long-term benefit. Another potential criterion—grounded in nonaban-
donment considerations—would be whether non-transplant alternatives (or 
the receipt of less healthy organs) would be likely to subject older patients 
to unacceptable pain, or instead would merely provide them with fewer ex-
pected years of life. 
The lifetime justice approach also provides grounds for doubt about 
the high significance that many allocation systems assign to how long a pa-
tient has been on a waiting list for an organ.249 Under the lifetime justice 
approach, if a child can gain many years of life from an organ and would be 
consigned to a vastly shortened life without one, she should receive priority 
over a middle-aged or older person who may have been waiting for a trans-
plant for longer than the child has been alive. Even if the mere passage of 
time can cement entitlements to what one already has, it should not support 
a greater entitlement to what one only hopes to receive.250 A better approach 
would create an eligibility pool rather than a waiting list, and would then 
select patients from the pool without regard to waiting time, except when 
waiting time predicts a patient’s prospect of benefit or predicts how badly 
they will fare without an organ. 
B. Reproductive Medicine 
Age-based criteria are common in reproductive medicine. ASRM rec-
ommends that “providers should implant embryos in women >50 years only 
after medical evaluation; and should discourage women >55 years from 
doing so . . . .”251 Many providers use even lower age cutoffs.252 Cryopres-
                                                                                                                           
 248 Cf. Areheart, supra note 122, at 996 (contrasting the easy application of anticlassification 
with the greater nuance required for antisubordination analysis). 
 249 See Clarke et al., supra note 139, at 38 (describing and endorsing the view that waiting 
time is an appropriate basis for allocation); see also Ross et al., supra note 5, at 2116 (asserting 
that “waiting time points have become the primary allocation factor” for deceased-donor kidneys); 
cf. Persad et al., supra note 154, at 424 (criticizing “first-come, first-served” allocation of organs). 
 250 Cf. David A. Super, A New New Property, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1773, 1813 (2013) (dis-
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some time”). 
 251 Klitzman, supra note 6, at 217. 
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ervation procedures are also subject to age limits: practice guidelines rec-
ommend against cryopreservation of eggs or ovarian tissue for women over 
thirty-eight, and only twenty-six percent of providers in a recent survey 
would provide cryopreservation services to women over forty.253 Some re-
productive clinics also consider the age of all prospective parents—not only 
the direct patient—when deciding whether to offer treatment.254 These poli-
cies often reflect concerns about children being orphaned: 
By including the father’s age in the decision and establishing a 
maximum cutoff, providers increased the odds that at least one par-
ent would be alive to raise the child. “Generally, their ages have to 
add up to less than 100. We came up with 100 because we don’t 
want gender bias, but want a parent around to raise the kid” . . . .255 
Governments also employ age-based criteria when making reimburse-
ment decisions: 
In order to begin to balance the costs to insurers, as well as pro-
mote the health and safety of both mother and child . . . New Jer-
sey, Rhode Island, New York, and Connecticut have put age re-
strictions on their insurance mandates. These states recognized that 
there must be a balance between comprehensive coverage and the 
costs associated with high risk pregnancies. New Jersey limits cov-
erage for in vitro fertilization to women forty-five or younger. 
Connecticut limits its coverage to individuals under the age of for-
ty. Rhode Island’s coverage is limited to women between twenty-
                                                                                                                           
 252 Id. at 218 (reporting statement of one physician that age forty-five is the cutoff for women 
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 253 Jacques Donnez et al., Restoration of Ovarian Activity and Pregnancy After Transplantation 
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five and forty-two. New York limits its mandate for infertility cov-
erage to women between age twenty-one and forty-four.256 
Many countries that subsidize assisted reproduction similarly set age cutoffs 
for reimbursement.257 Although these reimbursement limits do not consti-
tute a strict bar on access to treatment, their major implications for patients’ 
finances make them more than a mere default rule or nudge. 
Societal justifications are the most common basis for defensible age-
based criteria in reproductive medicine. Even though assisted reproductive 
treatments—unlike transplantable organs—are not absolutely scarce, the 
use of these treatments in older patients may be a low-priority use of scarce 
resources.258 Another defensible societal justification, distinctive to assisted 
reproduction, focuses on concerns about the well-being of the resulting 
child.259 These concerns include both risks of genetic abnormality and, as 
discussed above, being orphaned, being raised by parents who are unable to 
effectively care for a child, or experiencing the death of a parent during 
childhood.260 Assessing the force of these concerns, particularly as regards 
genetic risks, is complicated by the “non-identity problem”—even if the 
children of older parents face distinctive risks, these specific children could 
not have existed with different genetic parents, and are unlikely to have ex-
isted with different legal parents; their most likely alternative was not to 
exist at all.261 An alternative societal justification, not obviously vulnerable 
to the non-identity problem, would focus on the burdens imposed on society 
when children are orphaned, raised by parents who lack capacity, or suffer 
severe congenital disabilities: we might be able to say that appropriate regu-
lation can make society as a whole better off, even if we cannot say the 
same for its effects on specific children. Going beyond societal justifica-
tions, the most plausible patient-based justification for age-based criteria 
would be the financial burden on patients who are unlikely to benefit; con-
                                                                                                                           
 256 Camille M. Davidson, Octomom and Multi-Fetal Pregnancies: Why Federal Legislation 
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 257 Eleanor L. Stevenson & Jamie Kanehl, Utilization of ART Services in Developed Coun-
tries and Impact on Cross-Border Reproductive Care, in FERTILITY AND ASSISTED REPRODUC-
TIVE TECHNOLOGY (ART): THEORY, RESEARCH, POLICY AND PRACTICE FOR HEALTH CARE 
PRACTITIONERS 201, 202 (Eleanor L. Stevenson & Patricia E. Hershberger eds. 2016). 
 258 See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 256, at 180. 
 259 See Klitzman, supra note 6, at 222. 
 260 See id. 
 261 Id.; see PARFIT, supra note 221, at 359 (coining the term “non-identity problem”); I. Glenn 
Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 423, 426 
(2011) (discussing the “non-identity problem”). 
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cerns about futility, meanwhile, could sometimes support provider-based 
justifications.262 
Fears of lawsuits can influence reproductive medicine providers’ deci-
sions: 
I do not have cutoffs because one clinic’s front office received a 
phone call and the caller said she would like to come in for IVF 
treatment. The staff member said, ‘‘Well, you’re passed our cutoff 
age—you’re 48. The doctors won’t treat you.’’ The caller was a 
judge, and filed a federal lawsuit for age discrimination.263 
Clarifying age discrimination law to differentiate animus and bias from jus-
tifications grounded in the legitimate interests of providers, patients, or so-
ciety might help to clarify providers’ obligations and to avoid the practice of 
defensive medicine. A cutoff age is not obviously objectionable when it is 
supported by evidence about differential efficacy, rather than by false stere-
otypes or claims about unnaturalness. Indeed, as I argue in Part II.A, an ex-
plicit cutoff age may reduce the risk of implicit bias.264 
Because assisted reproduction involves procreation, it generates unique 
legal questions, unrelated to age, that I cannot explore in depth. Although in-
dividuals have no established constitutional rights to receive transplants, they 
do have established constitutional rights to procreate, which might be used to 
undergird a claim that restrictions on access to reproductive treatment must 
meet the higher standard of scrutiny associated with restrictions on funda-
mental rights.265 But it is unclear whether the heightened scrutiny already 
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required where fundamental rights are at stake would be further intensified by 
the use of age-based criteria, given that age-based criteria do not warrant 
heightened scrutiny on their own.266 Meanwhile, because assisted reproduc-
tion produces a child, the “best interests” of that child could serve as a coun-
terweight to an older patient’s asserted right to procreate.267 
C. Screening Tests 
The United States Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF), which 
makes expert recommendations about screening tests, frequently uses age-
based criteria in its recommendations.268 This likely reflects both the impos-
sibility of basing decisions about whether to provide screening tests—which 
provide detailed information about patients’ health risks—on detailed 
preexisting knowledge of patient health status, and the easy accessibility of 
patients’ age to both patients and providers. The USPSTF’s recommenda-
tions are not directly legally binding; however, the ACA’s regulations incor-
porate the USPSTF’s recommendations, and private parties also rely on 
them.269 Perhaps for these reasons, a revision to the USPSTF’s mammogra-
phy guidelines recommending an age-based exclusion of younger women 
was highly controversial, with the ACA directing federal programs to ig-
nore the recommendations.270 As with transplantation and reproductive 
medicine, concerns about legal liability—including liability for discrimina-
tion—are likely to discourage the use of age-based criteria, even when tests 
may be ineffective or harmful for older adults.271 
A distributive justice approach is consistent with patient-based and 
provider-based rationales for using age-based criteria that appeal to the risk 
of overdiagnosis and overtreatment following screening, as well as the risk 
                                                                                                                           
duction”); cf. J.R. v. Utah, 261 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1279 (D. Utah 2002) (suggesting that a statute that 
purported to prevent access to or “prohibit use of gestational surrogacy as a procreative method” 
would be legally infirm). 
 266 But see Kohn, supra note 72, at 273–75. 
 267 See Klitzman, supra note 6, at 220; ESHRE Task Force, supra note 253, at 1233. But see 
Cohen, supra note 261, at 426 (arguing that a best interests analysis is inapplicable in cases where 
the child could not have existed otherwise). 
 268 See U.S. PREVENTIVE SERVS. TASK FORCE, supra note 7 (recommending age-based crite-
ria for aortic aneurysm, cervical cancer, colorectal cancer, diabetes, gonorrhea, HIV, and lung 
cancer screening). 
 269 See Mary Helen McNeal, Say What? The Affordable Care Act, Medicare, and Hearing 
Aids, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 621, 655 & n. 245, 668 (2016). 
 270 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-12(a)(5) (West 2019); Persad, supra note 21, at 125 & n.27. 
 271 Renee Twombly, Preventive Services Task Force Recommends Against PSA Screening 
After Age 75, 100 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 1571, 1571 (2008) (observing that “some physicians 
predict that the USPSTF’s revised guideline will generally be ignored—particularly by urolo-
gists—for a variety of reasons, including fears of age discrimination”). 
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of direct harm from screening itself.272 Screening older patients may be a 
net harm to them, and may implicate providers in the infliction of harm. 
Using age-based criteria when making screening decisions is also consistent 
with societal rationales that appeal to resource stewardship—screening old-
er patients may impose high costs on the public fisc while producing few 
benefits, or consume resources and physician time that could be used to 
screen patients who are more likely to benefit.273 
D. Clinical Research 
Clinical trials of experimental interventions frequently exclude older 
adults.274 Although the obligations involved in the researcher-participant rela-
tionship are different from those involved in the physician-patient relation-
ship, recent scholarly literature has criticized the use of age-based exclusion 
criteria on the basis that they unfairly exclude older people from the benefit of 
research innovations.275 Meanwhile, Daniel Callahan has argued for reducing 
clinical research spending on diseases suffered primarily by older patients.276 
The lifetime justice approach, in contrast to both of these approaches, 
supports neither the elimination of age-based criteria nor the categorical 
exclusion of older people from clinical trials. Rather, it supports stratifying 
older patients into “elderly-specific” trials; although such stratification has 
raised concerns about discrimination, it has also helped older patients ac-
cess better-tailored care.277 Elderly-specific trials recognize that older pa-
tients are not similarly situated to younger patients, and have genuinely dif-
ferent needs and ethical entitlements, but nonetheless have a claim to bene-
fit from research. 
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E. Health Insurance 
Moving from medical practice and research to health care financing, 
whether health insurers should be permitted to use age-based criteria to set 
premiums has been a prominent issue in the public debate over the future of 
the ACA. It prohibits plans offered on the state or federal marketplaces from 
varying their premiums on the basis of age by more than a three to one ra-
tio.278 The changes proposed as part of a 2017 Republican repeal effort 
would have raised the ratio permitted by regulation to five to one, although 
other repeal proposals would have eliminated the regulation entirely.279 The 
proposed changes were castigated as an “age tax” and were unpopular in 
polls.280 Popular criticisms of the repeal proposals have typically employed 
simplified anticlassificationist rhetoric. As an example, Senator Chris Mur-
phy described the practice of “charging older people more” for health insur-
ance as part of why one repeal proposal was an “intellectual and moral gar-
bage truck fire.”281 I largely agree with Senator Murphy’s assessment of the 
repeal proposals, but disagree with his anticlassificationist reasoning. Under 
the lifetime justice approach, age-based criteria that disadvantage older pa-
tients compared to younger ones, such as age rating, can sometimes be 
normatively justified. 
Nonetheless, bringing the broader structure of the health care system 
into view demonstrates the plausibility of Senator Murphy’s overall verdict. 
Those who qualify for Medicare at sixty-five pay a comparatively low pre-
mium thereafter for health insurance.282 The repeal proposals would create a 
strange cliff-like premium structure, where premiums rise sharply in late 
middle age and then suddenly plummet at sixty-five. The burdens of such a 
structure would fall most severely not on the oldest people, but on those 
between fifty-five and sixty-five.283 Accordingly, even if it marginally im-
proved equity between the young and the middle-aged, a five to one  or un-
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limited ratio would seriously violate equity between the middle-aged and 
the old. Correlations between life expectancy and economic and educational 
advantage, as well as between race and life expectancy, make this problem 
even more pressing.284 As an example, the repeal proposal would have 
heavily burdened people in economically deprived southern West Virginia, 
eastern Kentucky, and South Dakota counties where life expectancy at birth 
is less than sixty-nine years of age, who would pay both high insurance 
premiums and Medicare taxes without surviving long enough to receive 
many Medicare benefits; in contrast, people in the wealthy DC suburbs, 
where life expectancy at birth is over eighty, would be likely to survive past 
the “cliff” of high premiums and receive substantial Medicare benefits.285 
The lifetime justice approach also has implications for “Medicare for 
All” proposals.286 It suggests that, within Medicare for All, premiums for 
younger participants should be lower than those for middle-aged participants, 
which should in turn be lower than those for older participants. This would 
have both the salutary effect of encouraging younger people to join the sys-
tem (thereby shoring up its actuarial foundations and protecting younger peo-
ple from catastrophic expenses), and the normatively desirable effect of pre-
venting early death and medical deprivation among younger people by easing 
their access to affordable health care.287 Although some have speculated that 
age rating constitutes age discrimination,288 there is no case law reaching this 
conclusion, and many states explicitly permit insurers to vary premiums 
based on age.289 That the ACA permits a three to one difference in premiums 
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between older and younger customers further suggests that some differentia-
tion by age is legally allowable.290 
More generally, the lifetime justice approach highlights a challenge in 
designing a program like Medicare equitably, namely that insurance is typi-
cally designed to indemnify people against the consequences of bad luck. 
Automobile insurance compensates you if your car is totaled in an accident. 
Homeowners’ insurance compensates you if your house is destroyed in a 
tornado. In contrast, old-age insurance programs like Medicare compensate 
people when they experience the good luck of living long enough to need 
health care at eighty-five or ninety-five. Medicare’s current design therefore 
makes it similar to a hypothetical insurance program that pays out only after 
a good event happens—for instance, insurance against one’s income drop-
ping below the median level that kicks in only after one’s income rises 
above the median. Such an insurance program is normatively dubious, be-
cause it protects the well-off while doing nothing for the worse-off.291 Re-
gardless of whether age-rating is used, lowering the age cutoff for access to 
Medicare—as Medicare for All does—helps to address this problem. 
CONCLUSION 
I have argued that the law neither does nor should adopt a general 
skepticism toward age-based criteria. The law, however, also should not 
leave unchallenged the operation of genuinely invidious age bias. Rather, 
the law should understand the use of age-based criteria as a way of fairly 
distributing the important good of years of life. I have proposed an account 
of how that good should be distributed and have applied my approach to 
several contexts where age-based criteria are currently in use. I hope that 
some readers who balk at details of the lifetime justice approach have nev-
ertheless come to see the plausibility of a distributive justice approach to 
age-based criteria, and that the taxonomy I have provided is useful even to 
readers who disagree entirely with my conclusions. 
One goal of this project is to assist those—including judges, adminis-
trators, and legislators, as well as providers and private individuals—who 
are involved in evaluating age-based criteria. Beyond this aim, the lifetime 
justice approach I propose can serve as a springboard for future research in 
law, ethics, and social science. Though I have not discussed how the life-
time justice approach might apply to administrative and legislative deci-
sions regarding the social determinants of health, such as decisions about 
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environmental policy or public health surveillance, this area is an important 
one for further analysis.292 So is the use of age-based criteria in private law 
contexts, such as the calculation of tort damages. I have also intentionally 
bypassed the challenge of incorporating quality of life considerations into 
the lifetime justice approach. This task requires identifying a way to meas-
ure quality of life that does not discriminate against people with disabili-
ties.293 Although I was too quick in earlier work to dismiss the possibility of 
a normatively defensible quality-of-life measure that avoids discrimination 
against people with disabilities, quality of life is a crucial area for future 
research.294 Meanwhile, turning to social science, research into the history 
of the social movements that have pushed to regulate the use of age-based 
criteria and into the empirical effects of adopting such criteria would be 
tremendously valuable. 
I close by discussing a final concern: some argue that the adoption of 
age-based criteria is politically impossible, either because of the political 
power of older voters or because of widespread public distaste for such cri-
teria.295 As a descriptive matter, the adoption of age-based criteria is not a 
political impossibility—many age-based criteria are in wide use. More im-
portantly, even if political barriers to adopting age-based criteria exist at 
present, analyzing their merits is important because political circumstances 
can and do change. As Joseph Carens argues, “even if we must take deeply 
rooted social arrangements as givens for purposes of immediate action in a 
particular context, we should never forget about our assessment of their 
fundamental character,” because “otherwise we wind up legitimating what 
should only be endured.”296 Changes in the demographics of American so-
ciety and upheaval in our health care system make the present moment one 
where changes in existing social arrangements are likely. Careful analysis of 
the role age should play in those arrangements can help ensure that those 
changes are steps toward, rather than away from, greater justice. 
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